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Abstract
This paper investigates ﬁrms’ pricing decisions and consumers’ net-
work choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. We
show that imposing some restrictions on the extent of coordination fail-
ure among consumers leads to clear qualitative conclusions about equi-
librium market conﬁgurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can co-
exist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider
and in the case of competing providers. These equilibria have the
p r o p e r t yt h a tc a nb eo b s e r v e di nm a n yd i ﬀerent two-sided markets:
one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other net-
work is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product diﬀerentiation
is endogenized by consumers’ network choices.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A market has network externalities if a consumer’s utility from purchasing
a product depends on which other consumers buy the same product. A
highlighted special case of this is two-sided markets with network external-
ities. In these markets, consumers are divided into two distinct subgroups.
A consumer’s utility on one side increases in the total number of consumers
on the other side of the market who buy the same product (and possibly
decreases in the number of consumers on the same side of the market). This
applies to various situations in which two groups of agents need a common
platform to interact and one or more ﬁrms own platforms and sell access
to them. The higher the number of agents on one side who join a plat-
form, the higher the utility of an agent on the other side of the platform,
because that agent has a higher number of potential partners with whom
to trade or interact. Examples of these types of networks include payment
card systems where the two sides are cardholders and merchants, videogame
platforms where the two sides are game developers and ﬁnal users, managed
care plans where the two sides are health providers and patients, classiﬁed
advertising, and directory services.
Because of positive network externalities, the utility of every consumer is
maximized if all of them join the same platform. Despite this, multiple large
networks coexist in many of these markets. This observation holds both for
markets in which there is a monopolist network provider (the same owner
operates multiple networks) and for markets in which there are multiple
competing providers. Furthermore, diﬀerent networks in the same market
are often priced quite diﬀerently. One type of market structure seems to
be particularly common in two-sided markets: it involves two networks, one
being cheaper and larger on one side of the market, and the other being
cheaper and larger on the other side. This conﬁguration typically implies
that most of the proﬁt from operating a network comes from one side of the
market, and that the two networks target diﬀerent market sides. The cheap
side of a network, which can even be subsidized and therefore generate loss,
is used to create a large enough consumer base that makes it attractive for
consumers on the other side of the market to join the network.1
This paper investigates the conditions for multiple asymmetric networks
coexisting in a two-sided market with network externalities. Our primary
1See Section 3 for several examples of this type of network structure, in diﬀerent set-
tings.
2interests are to understand the decisions of ﬁrms regarding how many net-
works to operate and how to price them, and to investigate the resulting
market shares on diﬀerent sides of the market. We address these questions
using an extensive form game: in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms establish networks; in
the second stage, they announce registration fees for these networks; and in
the third stage, consumers simultaneously choose networks or decide to stay
out of the market. We investigate both the case of a monopolist network
provider and the case of competing network providers. A central feature
of our model is that we allow for heterogeneity among consumers with re-
spect to how much they care about the externality (how much they value
if there are a lot of consumers from the other side of the market on the
same platform). This opens up a set of questions that have not been ad-
dressed in the existing literature: whether in equilibrium it is possible that
diﬀerent networks attract diﬀerent types of consumers, and whether price
discrimination among diﬀerent types of consumers is possible in the absence
of physical product diﬀerentiation.
As in all models with positive network externalities, there is a severe mul-
tiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in our game. To select among
them, we use the concept of coalitional rationalizability, proposed by Am-
brus (2006). This solution concept allows groups of players to coordinate
on playing certain strategies if it is in their mutual interest. The formal
solution concept we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibria in which players
play coalitionally rationalizable strategies in every subgame. The concept
implies that after certain price announcements, consumers can successfully
coordinate on joining a particular network. For example, if there are two
networks and one of them is cheaper on both sides of the market, then
all consumers for whom it is not an iteratively dominated strategy to join
some network end up joining the cheaper network. However, in other cases,
when there is no focal network on which to coordinate, the concept does
not necessarily impose successful coordination. In particular, the concept
we use is strictly weaker in our setting than extensive form coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al. (1987)).2 This is in accordance with
what we believe is a reasonable assumption for a market in which there is
a large number of participants: in some cases where there is a focal choice,
coordination is successful, while in other cases it might not be. The concept
we use is not related to requiring Pareto eﬃciency in subgames after price
2Despite this, the qualitative conclusions of the model would be unchanged if we used
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. See the discussion on this in
Section 4.
3announcements. In particular, if consumers are heterogeneous, then Pareto
eﬃciency can be a very weak requirement in the games we analyze. This
is our main motivation for using a solution concept that considers coordi-
nation by subgroups of players (coalitions): even if the set of all consumers
cannot successfully coordinate on choosing a network, there might be focal
choices for certain subgroups, establishing successful coordination within
these groups.
We investigate the possibility of multiple asymmetric networks in coali-
tion perfect equilibrium, and show that remarkably similar results hold
for the case of a monopolist network provider as to the case of compet-
ing providers. For a monopolist provider, we show that if consumers are
homogeneous in the sense of having the same reservation value for the net-
work good (an assumption imposed in most of the related literature), then
only one network is established in equilibrium. The reason is that dividing
consumers into multiple networks would entail losing some gross consumer
surplus, which would decrease the monopolist’s proﬁt. In case of competing
providers, homogeneous consumers imply that either there is only one active
network in equilibrium (all consumers join the same network), or there are
two perfectly symmetric networks. In either case, both ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
zero, just like in classic Bertrand competition without externalities. This
holds despite the fact that equilibrium prices do not have to be equal to the
marginal cost: consumers on one side of the market can be subsidized while
the other side might face a price above marginal cost.
The above results can be extended to cases when there is not too much
heterogeneity among consumers (the ratio of reservation values between any
two consumers is smaller than a certain threshold). However, we show that
multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in coalition perfect equilibrium if
there is enough heterogeneity among consumers.
A monopolist provider might want to establish two networks, which in
equilibrium are joined by diﬀerent types of consumers. The intuition is that,
if there are consumers with high reservation values on both sides of the
market, then the monopolist wants to extract surplus from both of these
groups. However, if there are relatively few of these consumers and the
monopolist operates only one network, then it can charge a high price on
at most one side. In order to charge a high price, there must be enough
consumers on the other side of the network, which is only possible if the
price charged on the other side is low. However, if the monopolist establishes
4two networks such that one of them is cheap on one side of the market
and the other network is cheap on the other side, then all consumers are
willing to join some network, and consumers with high reservation values
are willing to join the network that is more expensive for them. The way
price discrimination is achieved in these equilibria is through endogenous
product diﬀerentiation. Networks are physically the same, but if one side
of a network attracts many consumers, then the other side of the network
becomes more valuable.
The same type of asymmetric equilibrium, in which diﬀerent networks
attract diﬀerent types of consumers, can arise if there are competing network
providers in the market. Moreover, in these equilibria, ﬁrms can get positive
proﬁts in Bertrand competition. The intuition is that although ﬁrms can
steal each others’ consumers by undercutting their rival’s prices on both
sides of the market, this strategy is not necessarily proﬁtable. In particular,
undercutting might increase the number of consumers to be subsidized more
than the number of consumers who pay a positive price.
We show that in both the monopoly and duopoly cases, and for any
distribution of consumer utility functions, all asymmetric equilibria with
multiple active networks have the same qualitative features as the examples
we provide. Namely, one network is cheaper and larger on one side of the
market, and the other is larger and cheaper on the other side.
2 Related literature
Recently, a number of papers investigated the issue of optimal pricing and
price competition in markets with two-sided network externalities. For a
more extensive literature review, see for example Armstrong (2006).
Yanelle (1997) investigates competition in ﬁnancial intermediation. She
shows that Bertrand competition need not lead to zero proﬁts, as in our
model. However, the reason why this can happen is quite diﬀerent in our
model than in Yanelle’s. In the latter, it is crucial that the intermediaries
compete sequentially for the two sides of the market. This makes undercut-
ting a competitor’s price not necessarily an eﬀective strategy. In our setup,
network providers compete simultaneously for consumers on the two sides
of the market, and undercutting is always eﬀective (it “steals” all the con-
sumers from the other network) but, as we show, not necessarily proﬁtable.
5Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) study monopolistic pric-
ing and price competition between two ﬁrms on markets where the ﬁrms are
platforms that try to attract two groups of agents. The models in these pa-
pers abstract away from coordination problems among consumers. They as-
sume diﬀerentiable demand functions for the networks, implicitly assuming
diﬀerentiated networks (i.e., assuming that consumers have heterogeneous
inherent preferences between networks). Also, they focus on a particular
symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, Rochet and Tirole emphasize the case in
which the networks’ primary pricing instruments are transaction fees.
Jullien (2001) constructs a duopoly model that allows for more than two
subgroups of consumers and for both inter-group and intra-group network
externalities. The context of this paper diﬀers from ours mainly in that the
intrinsic value of the good sold by each ﬁrm is assumed to be high compared
to the network eﬀect.
Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mobius (2003a) study competition between two
auction sites. In their model, as in ours, multiple asymmetric platforms can
coexist in equilibrium, despite the lack of product diﬀerentiation. In addi-
tion to this, they assume heterogeneous agents on both sides of the market.
On the other hand, consumers choose platforms ex ante in their model, while
in our paper, consumers do so after learning about their types. Furthermore,
the reason that multiple active networks can coexist in equilibrium is com-
pletely diﬀerent in their model. They consider a ﬁnite number of buyers
and sellers: thus, when one of them switches from one platform to another,
he adversely aﬀects the market price on the latter platform.3 In our model,
there is a continuum of consumers on both sides of the market: therefore,
this market-impact eﬀect is absent.
The model in Damiano and Li (2005 and 2008) is similar to ours in that
consumers in a two-sided market are heterogeneous and that registration
fees serve the role of separating diﬀerent types of consumers. The main
diﬀerence between our setup and theirs is that there is no network externality
in the latter. Consumers care about the average quality, not the number, of
consumers on the other side of the network, whereas in our model, consumers
are symmetric with respect to the external eﬀect they generate on consumers
on the other side.
The model closest to ours is presented by Caillaud and Jullien (2001
and 2003). They analyze markets where ﬁrms are intermediaries oﬀering
3See Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) for a detailed analysis of this point.
6matchmaking services to two groups of agents. The above papers assume
that consumers on each side are homogeneous and that their utility is linear
in the number of consumers on the other side of the network.4 The assump-
tion of homogeneity implies that these papers do not address most of the
issues we investigate in this paper. Also, Caillaud and Jullien select among
equilibria by imposing monotonicity on the demand function of consumers
and by assuming full market coverage in equilibrium. Instead of making
an assumption about the aggregate demand function, our paper imposes
restrictions directly on the expectations of individual players.
In our model, diﬀerent types of consumers might elect to join diﬀerent
networks. In this aspect, our analysis is connected to the literature on price
discrimination (for an overview, see Varian (1987)), multi-product pricing
(see Baumol et al. (1982)), and the theory of screening (for an overview, see
Salanie (1997)).
3 Motivating examples: asymmetric networks in
various two-sided markets
The existence of multiple networks with diﬀerent pricing strategies is a com-
mon phenomenon in two-sided markets. One network structure that appears
in a wide variety of markets involves two networks such that one is larger
and cheaper on one side of the market, while the other is larger and cheaper
on the other side. This section provides examples in diﬀerent settings.
The two main platforms in the market for online job search in the US
are Careerbuilder.com and Monster.com. The companies operating these
web sites act as intermediaries between employers and job seekers. Mon-
ster.com has a database of 56 million resumes versus Careerbuilder’s 13
million; therefore it is larger on the job seekers’ side. On the other hand,
in February 2004, Careerbuilder had 45.2% of the job postings of the online
job search market in the US, while Monster had only 37.5%.5 Therefore,
4For a comparison between our results in this context and the ones of Caillaud and
Jullien (2003), see Subsection 6.1.
52004 February ﬁgures. The information about the size of the two databases was
obtained from the customer services of Careerbuilder and Monster. The prices for database
access are available on the two websites, and the information about the number of job
postings was obtained from Corzen.
7Careerbuilder is larger on this side. And to buy two-week access to Ca-
reerbuilder’s national database, a ﬁrm pays $500, while two-week access to
Monster’s national database costs $950.6
Another example comes from the early history of the payment card in-
dustry. A payment card constitutes a platform that allows cardholders and
merchants to complete their transactions. The ﬁr s tc a r dt ob ei n t r o d u c e d
was the Diners Club charge card in 1949—50, and it made most of its revenues
on the merchants side. A few years later, American Express introduced its
own payment card and chose the opposite pricing strategy. Quoting from
Evans and Schmalensee (2005): “American Express adopted a slightly dif-
ferent pricing policy than Diners Club. It initially set its annual fee at
$31, $5 higher than Diners Club, thereby suggesting that it was the more
"exclusive" card. But it set the initial merchant discount slightly lower: 5
to 7 percent for restaurants; and 3 to 5 percent for the recalcitrant hotel
industry.”7
In the U.S. health insurance market, the vast majority of the population
is enrolled in some form of managed care plan, which acts as a platform con-
necting health care providers and patients. A very common type of managed
care plan is the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). Folland, Goodman,
and Stano (2004) describe them as follows: “PPO’s give subscribers two dis-
tinct tiers of coverage. When subscribers use the PPO’s preferred provider
network, the required cost sharing is lower than when they use nonnetwork
providers. ... Patients simply must pay more out of pocket if they choose
to go outside the network. ... PPO contracts with physicians and hospitals
generally address the prices providers will charge the PPO. In return for
promising to charge a lower than average price, selected providers become
part of the PPO’s preferred network. No guarantee is given that the provider
will see patients under the plan, but if the network is not too large and the
PPO’s cost-sharing provisions for subscribers are network-favorable, then
the provider may enjoy a large increase in patient care business by joining
the network.”8 To summarize, a PPO typically operates two networks. One
has a smaller set of providers and a large number of patients: this network is
6The base cost of posting a resume is zero on both sites, but job seekers pay extra fees
for preferential treatment of their resumes (e.g., if they want them to come up at the top
of search result lists obtained by ﬁrms). We do not have information on how many job
seekers pay these extra fees: therefore, we cannot make a correct price comparison on this
side of the market.
7Evans, D. S. and R. Schmalensee (2005), p. 59.
8Folland S., Goodman A.C., and M. Stano (2004), p. 256.
8cheap for the patients while providers are compensated less by the PPO for
their services. The other network has many providers and a smaller number
of patients: this network is expensive for patients, but providers get higher
compensation for their services.
In the videogame market, the major competing platforms are PCs and
a number of game consoles. The two sides of this market are players and
game developers. For players, buying any of the game consoles currently
on the market is signiﬁcantly cheaper than buying a PC conﬁguration on
which most games are enjoyable.9 Game developers face the opposite price
pattern: publishing a game for a console requires paying royalties to the
producer of the console, while publishing on PC is virtually free.10 Accord-
ingly, most of the proﬁt of console producers comes from royalties paid by
game developers (typically the sales price of the console machines are even
subsidized, so by itself it generates a loss). As a result of the above pric-
ing policies, the number of games that are available for PC is very high,
given that large game developers tend to multi-home on all platforms while
small, independent developers publish only on PC.11 A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h e
estimated number of players using one of the popular game consoles consid-
erably exceeds the number of players using PC, judging by end-of-the-year
sales statistics comparing diﬀerent platforms.12
F i n a l l y ,t h et y p eo fn e t w o r kd i ﬀerentiation above is common in the mar-
ket for classiﬁed ads as well. In many towns, there is a classiﬁed ad magazine
that can be bought at newspaper stands, and there is also a freely distrib-
uted one. For advertisers, it is typically more expensive to place an ad in
the freely distributed magazine, since it reaches a wider audience. For a
concrete example, we acquired data from this market in Naples, Italy. The
most popular classiﬁed ads magazine, "Bric-a-brac" (the third most sold
9Among the standard requirements are: a fast processor, ample RAM, and high-end
video card.
10See Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2004) and "PC Gaming is NOT Dead, People,"
http://www.gamespot.com/features/burningquestions/?story=6122826.
11S e ef o re x a m p l e" T h eS t a t eO fC h u r c h : D o u gC h u r c ho n
the Death of PC Gaming and the Future of Deﬁning Gameplay,"
http://www.gamasutra.com/features/20041123/hall_01.shtml and "In-
terview: Ritual’s Robert Atkins on Console Life, PC Death,"
http://www.gamasutra.com/features/20050630/wen_01.shtml.
12See "The NPD Group reports annual 2004 U.S. video game industry retail Sales,"
http://www.npdfunworld.com/funServlet?nextpage=pr_body.html&content_id=2076
and "The NPD Group reports on retail sales of U.S. video game industry for ﬁrst half
2005," http://www.npdfunworld.com/funServlet?nextpage=pr_body.html&content_id=2173.
9journal in the region, after the two main newspapers) costs 1,70€ and sells
13,000 copies every week. Its publisher, Inthesa FA s.r.l., also publishes a
free press publication: “Free magazine motori,” which has a circulation of
75,000 copies.13 Both contain paid and free ads, and a paid ad on F.M.M.
costs about twice as much as the same ad on B.a.B.14
4 The Model
We consider a standard model of price competition in two-sided markets
with network externalities. It is a sequential move game in which ﬁrms ﬁrst
announce prices, then consumers observe the announcements, and ﬁnally
consumers choose which network to join, if any. We examine the cases of
one or two ﬁrms operating in the market. The new features of our model
are the following. First, consumers are not assumed to be homogeneous
in how much they value the network good. Second, we do not make any
restriction on the utility functions of consumers besides quasi-linearity in
money. Third, in the monopoly case we allow the ﬁrm to choose the number
of networks to be established.
Formally, the set of players in the model are two diﬀerent sets of con-
sumers (corresponding to the two sides of the market), and one or two
platform providers. We assume there is a continuum of consumers on both
sides of the market, indexed by the interval [0,1].
We consider a three-stage game with observable actions (i.e., after every
stage, all players observe all action choices made in that stage).
In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose how many networks to
establish. We will restrict attention to cases in which the maximum number
of networks a ﬁrm can operate is either one (in which case the decision at
this stage is trivial) or two.
In the second stage, the ﬁrms simultaneously set prices (registration fees)
for the established networks. Firms can charge diﬀerent registration fees on
diﬀerent networks or on diﬀerent sides of the same network. Furthermore,
they can charge negative prices on either side of the networks (subsidizing
13Source: Inthesa FA s.r.l.
14F.M.M. is in color, while B.a.B. is black and white, but the normal surcharge for color
on this market is 20-30%, so at least 70% of the surcharge is due to the larger circulation.
10consumers on that side).15 Let p
j
k denote the price of network k on side j.I f
there is only one network established, then we drop the subscript from the
notation.
In the third stage, the consumers simultaneously choose which network
to join, if any. We assume that a consumer can join at most one network
(exclusivity of networks).16 Let N
j
k denote the total number of consumers
on side j who join network k.
Firms maximize proﬁts. We assume that ﬁrms are identical and that the
cost of operating a network is zero, independent of the number of consumers
joining the network.17 Therefore, the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is the sum of the
revenues collected from the ﬁrm’s networks, where the revenue collected
from a network is sum of the revenue collected on side 1 and the revenue
collected on side 2. The proﬁt accumulated at network k is
2 P
j=1
p
j
kN
j
k.
Consumer i on side j maximizes the individual-speciﬁc utility function
U
j
i .L e tU
j
i =0if she does not join any network. Let U
j
i = g
j
i(N
−j
k )−p
j
k if she
joins network k. Assume g
j
i(0) = 0 and that g
j
i is strictly increasing for every
consumer C
j
i .18 A consumer’s utility when joining a network is quasilinear
in money and increases in the number of people joining the network from the
other side of the market.19 Implicit in the construction is that consumers do
not have any inherent preference for joining one network or another; they
only care about the number of people joining the networks and the price
they have to pay.
For some of the forthcoming results, wew i l la l s oa s s u m et h a ti n c r e m e n t a l
utilities resulting from a given increase in the number of consumers on the
other side are uniformly bounded by a positive constant:
15It is quite common to observe that consumers on one side of a two-sided market get
subsidized when they join a platform. Typically, the subsidy takes the form of free goods
or free extra services. For example, clubs often oﬀer women free entry and a free drink.
16See Subsection 7.2 for a discussion on relaxing this assumption.
17See Subsection 7.1 for a discussion on how the results aﬀected by assuming a positive
marginal cost.
18We assume that network participation is a pure network good for analytical conve-
nience. Most results of the paper could be generalized to the case of g
j
i(0) ≥ 0.
19The above speciﬁcation makes the simplifying assumption that a consumer’s utility
is independent of how many consumers join the network on her side, implicitly assuming
that interacting with consumers on the other side is a nonrival activity. Subsection 7.3
discusses implications of partially relaxing this assumption.
11A1: For every 0 ≤ N<N 0 ≤ 1 and every j ∈ {1,2}, there exists a
constant δj(N,N0) > 0 such that g
j
i(N0) − g
j
i(N) ≥ δ(N,N0) ∀ i ∈ [0,1].
Let u
j
i = g
j
i(1). We call u
j
i the reservation value of consumer i on side j.
If g
j
i = g
j
i0 ∀ i,i0 ∈ [0,1],a n dj ∈ {1,2}, then we say consumers are homo-
geneous. A special case of the above speciﬁcation, which received highlighted
attention in the existing literature, is when for every j =1 ,2 and i ∈ [0,1],
it holds that g
j
i(N
−j
k )=ujN
−j
k (i.e., consumers on the same side have the
same linear utility function).
Because of the positive network externalities, there is typically a severe
multiplicity of equilibria in the model presented above. We select among
them by using an equilibrium reﬁnement that allows players to coordinate
their actions whenever coordination is in their joint interest and does not
require communication. The formal concept we use is coalitional rational-
izability (Ambrus (2006)). This solution concept builds on the idea that
groups of players, or coalitions, consider implicit agreements to restrict their
play to a certain subset of the strategy space (to avoid playing some strate-
gies). These implicit agreements need to be self-enforcing. Restrictions that
are in the mutual interest of all coalition members are called “supported”
restrictions. The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is deﬁned by
an iterative procedure of supported restrictions by all possible coalitions,
starting from the set of all strategies. For the formal deﬁnition of coalitional
rationalizability, see Appendix A.
In the forthcoming analysis, we restrict attention to pure strategy sub-
game perfect equilibria in which players play coalitionally rationalizable
strategies in every subgame. We call these outcomes coalition perfect equi-
libria.
Deﬁnition: as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is a coalition perfect equilibrium if it is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and every player plays some coalitionally
rationalizable strategy in every subgame.
The games we analyze are such that there are no credible and mutually
advantageous restrictions between two ﬁrms, or between a ﬁrm and some
consumers. However, coalition perfect equilibrium puts restrictions on con-
sumers’ beliefs concerning other consumers’ choices after various network
choice and price announcements by the ﬁrms, both on and oﬀ the equi-
librium path. In particular, after certain price announcements, the concept
12implies that some consumers can successfully coordinate on joining the same
network. This is the case when coordinating on one network is in some sense
focal to the consumers–for example, if one network is cheaper on both sides
of the market than the rest of the networks.20 In other subgames, coalition
perfect equilibrium does not necessarily imply successful coordination by the
consumers, even if they would all be better oﬀ by coordinating. This can
happen if one network is cheaper on one side of the market, while the other
one is cheaper on the other side. Therefore, the concept we use assumes
only a weak form of coordination.
There are ways to both strengthen and weaken the solution concept used
without changing the qualitative results in the paper. A stronger concept
in our context would be extensive form coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
(Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987)).21 A weaker concept that would
lead to the same results could be obtained the following way. The set of
coalitionally rationalizable strategies corresponds to a possibly inﬁnite se-
quence of implicit coalitional agreements. Arguably, this requires too much
sophistication in the reasoning procedure of consumers. However, because
o ft h es i m p l ep a y o ﬀ structure of the games we examine, all our results would
r e m a i nv a l i di fw eo n l yr e q u i r e do n er o und of coalitional agreements after
eliminating nonrationalizable strategies.
The concept we use is not equivalent in any sense to requiring Pareto
eﬃciency in consumer subgames. In consumer subgames in which there
is a unique Pareto eﬃcient outcome, coalition perfect equilibrium implies
that the eﬃcient outcome is played. But in subgames with multiple Pareto
eﬃcient outcomes, it is consistent with coalition perfect equilibrium that a
Pareto ineﬃcient outcome is played. On the other hand, if consumers are
heterogeneous, then not every Pareto eﬃcient outcome is consistent with
coalition perfect equilibrium. Pareto eﬃciency only checks whether a given
outcome can be improved for the set of all players, while coalition perfect
equilibrium takes into account that subgroups of players can coordinate as
w e l l ,i fi ti si nt h e i rb e s ti n t e r e s t .
20See Appendix A for two examples on how coalitional rationalizability restricts action
choices in consumer subgames.
21In general there is no containment relationship between coalition perfect equilibrium
and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. In the games that we analyze though the latter
implies more eﬀective coordination on the part of consumers. This can lead to a strictly
smaller set of equilibrium prices in our model than what is compatible with coalition
perfect equilibrium.
13The concept we use is also substantially diﬀerent from the selection cri-
terion in Jullien (2001), which assumes that consumers coordinate on the
equilibrium that is most favorable to one of the ﬁrms (the incumbent).22
5 Monopolist network provider
In this section, we assume that there is a monopolist network provider, and
that the monopolist can decide whether to establish one or two platforms
(to which we will refer as network 1 and network 2).
Our ﬁrst theorem, which applies to any distribution of consumer prefer-
ences, will be useful in establishing the subsequent results.
The proofs of all theorems that are stated in the main section of the
paper are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 If there is a monopolist network provider, then the proﬁto f
the monopolist in a coalition perfect equilibrium is at least as much
as the maximum possible proﬁt attainable by the monopolist in Nash
equilibrium with one network.
The intuition for this result is the following. Consider the most proﬁtable
Nash equilibrium, and let N∗ be the set of consumers joining the network
in that equilibrium. Each consumer in N∗ must receive nonnegative utility.
Therefore, if the monopolist charged any set of prices smaller than those in
the most proﬁtable Nash equilibrium, and all the consumers in N∗ joined
the network, each of them would receive a strictly positive utility. Our
assumption that consumers can coordinate their network choices as long as
their interests are aligned implies that in this case the consumers in N∗
would indeed join the network. In particular, the monopolist can announce
prices arbitrarily close to the prices in the most proﬁtable Nash equilibrium,
and still make sure that all consumers in N∗ join the network. Therefore,
the monopolist can achieve any proﬁt level arbitrarily close to the level in
the most proﬁtable Nash equilibrium.
22To get an intuition on how the implications of the two selection criteria diﬀer in the
context of two-sided markets, see Subsection 6.1. There we make a direct comparison, in
a special context, between our results and those of Caillaud and Jullien (2001). The latter
paper uses a selection criterion (full market coverage, and monotonicity in prices) that is
closely related to the one proposed by Jullien (2001).
145.1 Homogeneous consumers
Here we show that if consumers are homogeneous, then a monopolist network
provider always establishes only one network.
Theorem 2 Assume that the reservation value of every consumer on side j
is uj (for j =1 ,2). Then in any coalition perfect equilibrium, the mo-
nopolist establishes only one active network and charges prices equal to
the reservation values. Furthermore, all consumers join this network.
This result is a consequence of Theorem 1. By providing one network,
the ﬁrm can extract the maximum possible gross consumer surplus in this
market. If there are two active networks, then gross consumer surplus is
smaller than in the above case, and since no consumer can get negative
utility in any Nash equilibrium, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is strictly smaller than
what it could obtain by establishing only one network. The assumption that
consumers can implicitly coordinate their choices in this case ultimately
hurts them because the ﬁrm can extract all the potential consumer surplus
in the market.
5.2 Two types of consumers on both sides
There are several reasons to expect that a monopolist network provider al-
ways wants to establish only one network in our model, even when consumers
are heterogeneous. One is that the amount of revenue a monopolist can get
from a consumer cannot be higher than the utility this consumer obtains
from joining the network, and the utility of every consumer is larger if all
consumers are on the same network than if they are divided into two net-
works. Second, our assumption that consumers have at least some ability
to coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so ex-
cludes the possibility that the monopolist establishes an expensive network
for relatively high valuation consumers and a cheap one for low valuation
consumers, since then all consumers would just choose the cheaper network.
In this subsection, we show by example that, despite these arguments, a
monopolist can ﬁnd it feasible and proﬁtable to divide the consumers and
operate two active networks. We show that in this case, one network is
cheaper and larger on one side of the market, while the other network is
cheaper and larger on the other side. In the next section, we show that
15these qualitative features of equilibria with two networks generalize to any
distribution of consumer preferences.
In the remainder of this subsection, we assume that there are only two
types of consumers on each side, and consumers have linear utility functions.
Assume that g
j
i(N)=u
j
i · N ∀ j =1 ,2 and i ∈ [0,1]. Also assume
that u1
i = u2
i = h ∀i ∈ [0,a] and u1
i = u2
i = l ∀i ∈ (a,1],w h e r el<hand
a ∈ (0,1).
On each side, a fraction a of the consumers have a reservation value h,
which is higher than l, the reservation value of the rest of the consumers.
We refer to consumers with reservation value h as high types, and consumers
with reservation value l as low types.23
It is possible to establish that in this context, a monopolist will never
want to establish more than two networks. Below, we concentrate on the
choice between establishing one versus two networks.
As a ﬁrst step, we characterize the set of coalition perfect equilibria when
the ﬁr mc a no n l ye s t a b l i s ho n en e t w o r k .
Deﬁne the following cutoﬀ points:
t1 ≡ 2a − 1 (1)
t2 ≡
a
2 − a
(2)
Notice that if a ≥ 1
2,t h e n0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1
2, while if a ≤ 1
2,t h e n
t1 ≤ 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 1
2. Also, notice that both t1 and t2 are strictly increasing in a.
Theorem 3 Assume the monopolist can only establish one network. For
every coalition perfect equilibrium, the following hold:
1. If l
h < max{0,t 1}, then p1 = p2 = ah and only the high types on both
sides join the network.
23Note that high and low type only refer to the reservation value of consumers and not
to their quality in terms of how desirable a consumer’s presence is on the network for
consumers on the other side. In our model, all consumers are ex ante identical in terms
of this external eﬀect.
162. If l
h ∈ (max{0,t 1},t 2), then there is j ∈ {1,2} such that pj = al,
and on side j, all consumers join the network, while p−j = h and on
side −j, only high types join the network.
3. If l
h ∈ (t2,1), then p1 = p2 = l a n da l lc o n s u m e r so nb o t hs i d e sj o i n
the network.
Finally, if l
h = t1, there are coalition perfect equilibria of both type
1 and type 2 above. Similarly, if l
h = t2, then there are coalition
perfect equilibria of both type 2 and type 3 above.
The coalition perfect equilibrium is almost always unique, but depends
on the values of parameters a, h,a n dl.I fl is relatively low and a is high,
then the monopolist targets only the high type consumers and charges a
high price on both sides. If l is relatively high and a is small, then the
monopolist targets all consumers and charges a low price on both sides. In
cases in between, the monopolist might target all consumers on one side and
only the high types on the other side, by charging a low and a high price.
These results are both intuitive and in accordance with classic results from
the literature on multi-product pricing with heterogeneous consumers.
Note that if a<1/2, then there is no coalition perfect equilibrium in
which the monopolist charges a high price on both sides of the market,
targeting only high types. Charging a high price on one side of the market
has to be accompanied by charging a low price on the other side. The reason
is that there must be enough consumers on the other side on the network
for high types on the ﬁrst side to be willing to pay the high price. The
monopolist therefore cannot extract a high level of consumer surplus from
both sides of the market simultaneously.
Assume now that the monopolist can choose to establish two networks.
The next theorem shows that for a range of parameter values in every coali-
tion perfect equilibrium, the monopolist chooses to operate two networks,
and high and low type consumers on the same side of the market choose
diﬀerent networks.
Deﬁne the following cutoﬀ points:
z1 ≡ 4a − 1 (3)
z2 ≡
a(1 − 2a)
1 − a
(4)
17Notice that if a ∈
h
0,1 −
√
2
2
i
, then t1 ≤ z1 ≤ t2 ≤ z2, and both z1 and
z2 are strictly increasing in a.
Theorem 4 If a ∈
³
0,1 −
√
2
2
´
and l
h ∈ (max{0,z 1},z 2), then the follow-
ing hold for every coalition perfect equilibrium:
(1) The monopolist establishes two networks.
(2) There is j ∈ {1,2} such that all high types on side j and all low types
on side −j join network 1, while all low types on side j and all high types
on side −j join network 2. The prices are p
j
1 = p
−j
2 = h(1 − 2a)+al and
p
j
2 = p
−j
1 = al.
Note that this range of parameter values cuts into two regions: one,
where a monopolist with one network would target all consumers on both
sides, and another, where he would target only high type consumers on one
side and all consumers on the other.
By establishing two networks and pricing them diﬀerently, the monopo-
list implements a form of second-degree price discrimination. In particular,
if the proportion of high types is suﬃciently low, then, even if reservation
values are unobservable, the monopolist can separate the low types and the
high types on each side, by charging a high price on side 1 and a low price
on side 2 in one network, and doing the opposite on the other network. An
appropriate choice of prices results in low type consumers choosing networks
that are relatively cheap for them and high type consumers choosing the ones
that are relatively expensive for them. In equilibrium, the two networks, de-
spite being physically equivalent, end up being of diﬀerent quality. In our
framework, the quality of a network for a consumer is determined by how
many consumers join the network on the other side of the market. If the
majority of consumers on each side of the market are low types, then when
all low type consumers on side 1 join one network, that network becomes
higher quality for side 2 consumers. Similarly, when all low type consumers
on side 2 join one network, that network becomes higher quality for side 1
consumers. Since in the above equilibria the low type consumers join diﬀer-
ent networks, one network ends up being high quality for side 1 consumers,
and the other for side 2 consumers. High type consumers have a higher
willingness to pay for quality and therefore are willing to join the networks
that are more expensive for them.
18The result that in equilibrium the monopolist separates consumers on
t h es a m es i d eb yo ﬀering them two products that have diﬀerent prices and
qualities is standard in the adverse selection literature.24 What is special to
this model is that the two networks are ex ante identical and that product
diﬀerentiation is endogenous. The quality of a network is determined in
equilibrium by the network choices of the consumers, which are driven by
the prices of the networks.
The reason the monopolist might be better oﬀ by the price discrimination
is that it can extract a large consumer surplus from high type consumers
simultaneously on both sides of the market, something that it cannot achieve
by operating only one network (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
In the above equilibrium, the ﬁrm sacriﬁces some gross consumer surplus
(it is socially eﬃcient if all participating consumers are on the same network)
in order to be able to extract a high share of the surplus from consumers
with high reservation values on both sides of the market.
High Fee High Fee
Low Fee Low Fee l
h h
l
SIDE 2 SIDE 1
Figure 1
Despite this, the aggregate social welfare in the situation in which the
monopolist is not allowed to operate multiple networks can be either higher
24See Mussa-Rosen (1978) and Maskin-Riley (1984).
19o rl o w e rt h a ni nt h es i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hi tc a no n l yo pe r a t eo n e .I f l
h ∈ (t2,z 2),
then a monopolist operating only one network charges prices (l,l) and all
consumers join the network. This generates a higher aggregate surplus than
if the monopolist can operate two networks, because the same set of con-
sumers participate in the market in both cases, but more surplus is generated
if they all join same network. As far as consumer surplus is concerned, high
types are better oﬀ if the monopolist can only run one network and low types
are indiﬀerent (they get zero utility in both cases). On the other hand, if
l
h ∈ (z1,t 2), then, being restricted to operate one network, the monopolist
sets a price of h on one side and la on the other. Only high types join the
network on the ﬁrst side, and all consumers on the other side. In this case,
high type consumers are better oﬀ if the monopolist can operate two net-
works and low types are again indiﬀerent. Furthermore, simple calculations
show that aggregate social surplus is higher in the case of two networks.
Equilibrium prices and quantities have to satisfy the “incentive com-
patibility constraints” that require that a high type consumer should pre-
fer the more expensive network, while a low type consumer should pre-
fer the cheaper network. Furthermore, since staying out of the market is
an option to every consumer, consumers have to get nonnegative utility in
equilibrium–a “participation constraint.” One feature of the above result,
which is consistent with the literature on adverse selection, is that the in-
centive compatibility constraints for the high types and the participation
constraints for the low types are binding in equilibrium.
5.3 General results
In the example presented in the previous subsection, equilibrium with two
neworks had a particular asymmetric structure. The next result establishes
that this feature generalizes to any distribution of consumer preferences for
which incremental utilities from increasing the number of consumers on the
other side of the network are bounded by a positive constant.
Theorem 5 Assume A1 holds. If a monopolist establishes two active net-
works in a coalition perfect equilibrium, then one is (weakly) cheaper
and larger on one side of the market, while the other is (weakly)
cheaper and larger on the other side. Moreover, these relationships
are strict at least on one side.
20The intuition behind the result is that when consumers have some ability
to coordinate their choices when it is in their interest to do so, the monopolist
cannot establish two active networks such that one is cheaper on both sides.
If he did so, all consumers would just choose the cheaper network. Moreover,
it is never in the interest of the monopolist to establish two networks and
set exactly the same prices, since the same consumers who join the two
networks would be willing to pay higher prices if all of them were on the
same network. The claim on equilibrium market shares follows from the
asymmetry of prices and the rationality of consumers.
T h ea b o v er e s u l tc a nb es t r e n g t h e n e di fw ea s s u m et h a tc o n s u m e r ’ su t i l -
ity functions are (weakly) convex.
Theorem 6 Assume that the utility functions of all consumers are convex.
If a monopolist establishes two active networks in a coalition perfect
equilibrium, then one is strictly cheaper and larger on one side of the
market, while the other is strictly cheaper and larger on the other side.
Whether a monopolist wants to establish multiple networks depends on
the dispersion of consumer types. A necessary and suﬃcient condition is
hard to characterize analytically, since the constraints implied by coalitional
rationalizability can be very complicated if there are many consumer types.
But for (weakly) convex utility functions, it is possible to provide a simple
necessary condition, in the form of an upper bound on the ratio of utilities
of any two consumers on the same side, from joining the same network. In
particular, if this ratio is always smaller than a particular threshold level
(roughly 5.8), then the monopolist establishes only one network in equi-
librium. We note that for concave utility functions, a smaller amount of
heterogeneity might be enough for the existence of multiple networks in
equilibrium. The intuition is that, if utility functions are more concave, then
dividing consumers into diﬀerent networks results in a smaller eﬃciency loss.
Deﬁne the dispersion of utility levels on side j to be sup
i∈[0,1]
sup
N∈(0,1]
g
j
i (N)
g
j
i0(N).
Theorem 7 If consumers’ utility functions are convex, and the dispersion
of utility levels on each sides of the market is less than 3+2
√
2, then
the monopolist establishes only one active network in every coalition
perfect equilibrium.
21The key point in the proof is to show that, under the conditions of the
theorem, establishing one network and charging prices equal to the lowest
reservation value on each side is always more proﬁtable than establishing
two active networks. Establishing two active networks implies sacriﬁcing
some consumer surplus: therefore, it can only be proﬁtable if there are some
consumers with suﬃciently high reservation values relative to others.
We note that the results of this section carry over to the case when
consumers can join multiple networks at the same time (multi-homing).25
Furthermore, the latter framework is formally equivalent to one in which
the monopolist operates only one network but can sell restricted access to
the network. Therefore, our results also imply that a monopolist on a two-
sided market might want to sell both limited access to its consumers at a
lower price, and full access at a higher price, on both sides of the market.
This can occur in contexts in which it is technically feasible for the ﬁrm
to control which transactions/matches can be made on the network, and if
there is enough heterogeneity among consumers in how much they value the
network eﬀect.
6 Competing network providers
In this section, we derive results for the case of competing network providers
that are parallel to the theorems provided in the previous section, for the
case of a monopolist provider. In particular, multiple asymmetric networks
can coexist in coalition perfect equilibrium, but only if there is suﬃcient
heterogeneity among consumers.
6.1 Homogenous consumers
In this subsection, we assume that there are two platform providers and that
consumers on the same side have the same reservation value: u1 on side 1
and u2 on side 2.
In theorem 8, we show that either one ﬁrm attracts all consumers on both
sides of the market, or the two ﬁrms charge the same prices and split the
market equally, with each of them attracting exactly half of the consumers on
25See Subsection 7.2 for a discussion.
22both sides.26 In both these conﬁgurations, the two ﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
Just like in the monopoly case, multiple asymmetric networks cannot coexist
in equilibrium if consumers are homogenous.
Theorem 8 If all consumers on the same side have the same reservation
value, then there can be two types of coalition perfect equilibria in the
duopoly game:
1. all consumers join the same network k, which is priced such that such
that p1
k = −p2
k;
2. both networks attract exactly half of the consumers on both sides, and
prices are such that p1
1 = p1
2 = −p2
1 = −p2
2.
The theorem re-establishes the zero-proﬁt result in a symmetric Bertrand
duopoly game, for markets with network externalities. The intuition is that
slightly undercutting the competitor’s price on both sides results in stealing
the whole market, since then we assume that consumers coordinate on the
cheaper network. However, as opposed to a market with no network ex-
ternalities, equilibrium prices are not necessarily equal to the marginal cost
(assumed to be 0). It is possible that consumers on one side of the market
are subsidized, and consumers on the other side pay a price that is exactly
equal to the subsidy received by the former group.
One feature that is common to all equilibria is that there is full consumer
participation on both sides. If equilibrium prices are zero on both sides,
then this follows from the assumption that consumers have some ability to
limit coordination failures. If consumers do not join any network, each of
them receives zero utility. If all consumers join some network instead, each
of them expcts a positive payoﬀ, even if perfect coordination on just one
network is not guaranteed. On the other hand, in the case where one side
of the market is subsidized, then joining a network is clearly dominant for
consumers on the subsidized side. Suppose now that at the same time not
all consumers join the networks on the side where price is positive. Then
one of the networks could proﬁtably deviate by slightly undercutting the
26It can be shown that imposing the stronger concept of extensive form coalition proof
Nash equilibrium eliminates the second type of equilibrium. Therefore, when consumers
are homogenous, all consumers join the same network in every extensive form coalition
proof Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game.
23market price on both sides and guarantee that all consumers from both
sides (including the one with positive price) join its network, contradicting
that the market is in equilibrium.
The next result establishes that if the reservation values on the two sides
are not exactly equal, then in every equilibrium the side with the smaller
reservation value has to be subsidized.27
Theorem 9 If uj <u −j for j ∈ {1,2}, and in a coalition perfect equilib-
rium some consumers join network k,t h e np
j
k ∈ [−u−j,u j − u−j].
This result is not a consequence of coalitional rationalizability, but comes
from the restrictions that “divide and conquer” strategies put on any sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium.28 If the market price is positive on the side
with the low reservation value, then it is relatively cheap to steal consumers
on that side, and then a higher price can be charged on the side with the
high reservation value.
It is straightforward to use Theorems 8 and 9 to characterize the set of
coalition perfect equilibria for the case when utility functions are linear.
Claim 1 Let g
j
i(N−j)=N−juj ∀ j =1 ,2 and i ∈ [0,1]. Then the following
hold:
• If uj ≤ 2u−j ∀ j =1 ,2, then two types of coalition perfect equilibria
exist:
27This asymmetric price structure, which entails one side being subsidized and the other
being charged a positive price, is extremely common in two-sided markets. For a list of
examples, see Rochet-Tirole (2003).
28The terminology “divide and conquer strategies” was introduced by Innes and Sexton
(1993). Jullien (2001) and Caillaud and Jullien (2001) investigate these strategies in the
context of price competition in two-sided markets. The main idea is that if a ﬁrm charges
as u ﬃciently low (negative) price compared to its rival on one side of the market, it can
make its network a dominant choice for consumers on that side. Then it can charge a
high price on the other side of the market and still make sure that consumers join its
network on that side. Despite the existence of these strategies, there is typically still a
severe multiplicity of SPNE.
241. (monopoly equilibria with zero proﬁt s )a l lc o n s u m e r sj o i nt h es a m e
network k, p1
k = −p2
k,a n duj <u −j implies p
j
k ≤ uj − u−j;
2. (symmetric equilibria with zero proﬁts) exactly half of the consumers
join each network on both sides, p1
1 = p1
2 = −p2
1 = −p2
2,a n duj <u −j implies
p
j
k ≤ uj − u−j.
• If uj > 2u−j for some j ∈ {1,2}, then only one type of coalition
perfect equilibrium exists:
(monopoly equilibria with zero proﬁt s )a l lc o n s u m e r sj o i nt h es a m en e t -
work k, p1
k = −p2
k, and p
j
k ∈ [−u−j,u j − u−j].
This linear and homogeneous speciﬁcation is exactly the one considered
in Caillaud and Jullien (2001): therefore, Claim 1 gives an opportunity
for a direct comparison of the results in a special setting. By assuming
monotonicity of the demand function, Caillaud and Jullien obtain the same
set of equilibria with two active ﬁrms. Their reﬁnement, however, selects
a larger set of equilibria with one active ﬁrm, including equilibria in which
the active ﬁrm gets positive proﬁts. Furthermore, full participation is an
extra assumption in their model, while it is implied by the same assumption
(coalitional rationality) as the rest of the results in our model.
6.2 Asymmetric networks with heterogeneous consumers: an
example
Below, we show that just like in the monopoly case, multiple asymmetric
networks can also emerge in equilibrium if there are two competing network
providers. One interesting feature of this example is that the ﬁrms have
positive proﬁts in Bertrand competition, despite the assumption that con-
sumers are coalitionally rational (which implies that each ﬁrm could “steal”
all of the consumers from other ﬁrm by slightly undercutting its rival’s prices
on both sides of the market).
Consider the following speciﬁcation. There are two ﬁrms in the market.
All consumers have linear utility functions. Furthermore, on both sides of
the market consumers’ reservation values are distributed as follows:
− a mass of consumers with measure 0.4 have reservation value 2.55 (‘I’
types)
25− a mass of consumers with measure 0.15 have reservation value 0.51 (‘II’
types)
− a mass of consumers with measure 0.1 have reservation value 0.46 (‘III’
types)
− a mass of consumers with measure 0.35 have reservation value 0.15 (‘IV’
types).
Claim 2 In the above game, there exists a coalition perfect equilibrium in
which one ﬁrm charges a price of 0.31 on side 1 and −0.2 on side
2, while the other ﬁrm charges −0.2 on side 1 and 0.31 on side 2.
All type ‘I’ consumers on side 1 and type ‘II’-‘IV’ consumers on side
2 join the ﬁrst ﬁrm, while all type ‘I’ consumers on side 2 and type
‘II’-‘IV’ consumers on side 1 join the second ﬁrm.
Note that in this proﬁle, both ﬁrms get a proﬁto f0.31 × 0.4 − 0.2 ×
0.6=0 .04, which is strictly positive. The ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices, and
consumers on the same side of the market with diﬀerent reservation values
end up paying diﬀerent prices for the market good, despite the fact that
reservation prices are private information of the consumers.
Every consumer on both sides of the market joins some network. Type
‘I’ consumers on both sides of the market pay a registration fee of 0.31 for
joining a network, and in equilibrium, they face a measure of 0.6 consumers
from the other side of the market. All other consumers on both sides of the
market are subsidized: they pay a registration fee of −0.2. In the equilib-
rium, they face only a measure of 0.4 consumers from the other side of the
market.
This equilibrium structure is similar to the equilibria in the previous
section, in which the monopolist achieved price discrimination by operating
two networks. In particular, one network is cheaper on one side of the
market, while the other one is cheaper on the other side. A larger fraction
of consumers, those having relatively low reservation values, join the cheap
network sides, which makes it worthwhile for the remaining, high reservation
value consumers to join the expensive network sides.
26The reason why competition does not drive proﬁts down to zero in the
above example is that, with heterogeneous consumers, deviation strategies
based on undercutting, while eﬀective, are not necessarily proﬁtable. For
example, if ﬁrm 2 announces slightly smaller prices than the equilibrium
prices of ﬁrm 1, then all type ‘I’-‘III’ from side 1 and all consumers from
side 2 join its network. But the highest proﬁt ﬁrm 2 can achieve this way is
strictly smaller than the equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm 1. The proposed under-
cutting increases the number of consumers joining the network by a larger
amount on the side where the price is negative.
The same intuition applies to so-called “divide and conquer” type strate-
gies. A ﬁrm can lower its price so that it makes it a dominant choice for some
type of consumers to join its network, and then it can charge a high price on
t h eo t h e rs i d eo ft h em a r k e ta n ds t i l lm a k es u r et h a ts o m ec o n s u m e r sj o i n
its network on that side as well. But if consumers are heterogeneous, then
the proportion of consumers who are willing to pay the increased price on
the latter side might be too low to compensate for the costs associated with
lowering the price (increasing the subsidy) on the ﬁrst side.
6.3 General results
In this subsection, we show that results similar to those in Subsection 5.3
can be established for the case of competing network providers, too. The
ﬁrst theorem establishes that for any distribution of consumer preferences,
in any equilibrium with positive proﬁts, the two competing networks have
to be asymmetric (prices and market shares are diﬀerent at least on one
side), with the particular structure that one network is cheaper and larger
on one side, and the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side.
As opposed to the monopoly case, assumption A1 is not needed to establish
this result.
Theorem 10 Suppose there are two ﬁrms in the market. If in a coalition
perfect equilibrium the proﬁto fa tl e a s to n eﬁrm is positive, then one
ﬁrm’s network is (weakly) cheaper and larger on one side of the market,
while the other ﬁrm’s network is (weakly) cheaper and larger on the
other side. Moreover, these relationships are strict at least on one side.
The reasons why equilibria with positive proﬁt in the duopoly case and
equilibria involving multiple networks in the monopoly case have the same
27asymmetric feature are not exactly the same. In both cases it cannot be that
one network is cheaper on both sides of the market, since then all consumers
would choose this network. In the monopoly case, it is never in the interest of
the ﬁrm to establish two networks that are priced equally, since that would
just split consumers into two networks, generating less consumer surplus.
In the duopoly case, there cannot be a coalition perfect equilibrium with
positive proﬁts and equally priced networks, because of the usual Bertrand
competition undercutting argument.
As in the case of a monopolist network provider, consumers need to be
heterogeneous enough for the coexistence of two asymmetric active networks.
The next theorem provides a necessary condition for multiple asymmetric
networks to coexist in coalition perfect equilibrium. Theorem 10 implies
that this is also a necessary condition for the existence of a coalition perfect
equilibrium in which at least one ﬁrm obtains a positive proﬁt. The condition
is expressed in terms of the ratio of the highest and lowest reservation value
for consumers on the same side. This ratio needs to be higher at least on
one side than a certain threshold. Note that this is a stronger requirement
than the one that the dispersion of utilities (as deﬁned in 5.3) is higher than
the same threshold on at least one side of the market.
Theorem 11 Suppose there are two ﬁrms in the market. If consumers’
utility functions are convex, and the ratio of reservation values of any
two consumers on the same side is less than 4/3, then there can be
two types of coalition perfect equilibria:
1. there is only one active network;
2. t h e r ea r et w oa c t i v en e t w o r k s ,p r i c e dt h es a m ea n da t t r a c t i n gt h es a m e
number of consumers, on both sides of the market.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the results of the paper would be aﬀected by
changing diﬀerent assumptions we made in the model.
287.1 Positive marginal cost
If ﬁrms face a positive constant marginal cost, all the qualitative results
still hold, with one exception. If the marginal cost is higher than a certain
threshold, then even if every consumer’s reservation value is still higher
than the marginal cost, it is not guaranteed that consumers can coordinate
on entering the market. If marginal costs are high, then the average price
charged on consumers is high, and ex ante coordination to join some network
becomes harder.
7.2 Multi-homing
In some two-sided markets, network choices are naturally mutually exclusive,
at least over a given period of time. For example, people looking for a date
can only be in one entertainment facility at a time. In other contexts,
consumers can join multiple platforms, which is called multi-homing in the
literature.
The main conclusions of the paper remain valid if we allow for multi-
homing. In particular, there can be multiple active networks in coalition
perfect equilibrium that are not equally priced, provided that one network
is cheaper and larger on one side of the market and the other network is
cheaper and larger on the other side. In fact, if multi-homing is possible,
then it is more likely that a monopolist ﬁnds it proﬁtable to operate two
networks rather than one. The intuition is that the monopolist can still set
prices such that low reservation value consumers only join the network that
is cheap on their side, but if multi-homing is allowed then high reservation
value consumers on one of the two sides join both networks. This increases
the monopolist’s revenue, which makes dividing consumers into two networks
more attractive, relative to establishing only one network.
7.3 Conﬂict of interest among consumers on the same side
The assumption that a consumer’s utility is not aﬀected by the number of
consumers from the same side of the market who join the same platform
can be restrictive in a variety of contexts. If the networks are matchmaking
services or auction sites, then people on the same side of the market might
compete for the same transactions. In other contexts, transactions are non-
rival goods, validating our assumption of no conﬂict of interest on the same
side.
29It is possible to partially relax the assumption of no conﬂict of interest on
the same side and retain some of the results in this paper. An earlier version
of this paper shows that the results concerning markets with small amounts
of heterogeneity hold even if some conﬂict of interest is allowed among con-
sumers on the same side.29 In particular, in this case, a monopolist always
operates only one network in coalition perfect equilibrium, and there cannot
be asymmetric active networks in duopoly competition either. In general,
the existence of multiple networks in coalition perfect equilibrium becomes
more likely if there is conﬂict of interest on the same side, because the latter
makes ex ante consumer coordination more diﬃcult.
7.4 More than two ﬁrms
With more than two ﬁrms operating on the market, the analysis of the price
competition game becomes complicated and therefore is omitted from this
paper. However, we note that there can exist coalition perfect equilibria with
multiple asymmetric networks in the case of more than two ﬁr m sa sw e l l .
In fact, in general there is a wider range of coalition perfect equilibria. The
reason is that coordination among consumers is more diﬃcult if there are
more than two ﬁrms, hence there are less restrictions that apply to consumer
choices after various price announcements.
8 Conclusions and possible extensions
This paper analyzes pricing decisions of ﬁrms and platform choices of con-
sumers in two-sided markets with network externalities, in a context where
consumers are heterogeneous with respect to how much they care about the
externality. We show that this type of heterogeneity can lead to asymmetric
market structures, with multiple diﬀerently priced networks coexisting in
the market. We provide necessary conditions for this to be possible, and we
derive qualitative properties of prices and market shares in these equilib-
ria. A natural next step for future research would be to allow for diﬀerent
types of heterogeneity among consumers on these markets. Besides diﬀer-
ences in preferences, consumers can be ex ante asymmetric with respect to
the network externality they generate–their “attractiveness” to consumers
on the other side. They might also be heterogeneous with respect to the
marginal cost their transactions generate on the platforms they join. Both
29Contact the authors for these extensions.
30of these features would introduce interesting adverse selection problems in
our model, which might be important in some two-sided markets.
9 Appendix A: coalitional rationalizability
Some extra notation for the Appendix.
Let C1 and C2 denote the set of consumers on sides 1 and 2, and let
C = C1 ∪ C2.L e tC
j
i denote consumer i on side j.
Let c
j
i denote the action choice of C
j
i . The set of possible choices for a
consumer is {∅,1,...,k},w h e r ek is the number of networks established and
∅ denotes the choice of not joining any network.
In the game with one ﬁrm, let πM denote the proﬁt of the monopolist.
In the duopoly game, let πk denote the proﬁto fﬁrm k (for k ∈ {1,2}).
Let S denote the set of strategies in the game. For every s ∈ S let πk(s),
p
j
k(s), N
j
k(s),a n dc
j
i(s) denote the realized nk, πk, p
j
k, N
j
k,a n dc
j
i if proﬁle
s is played.
Below, we provide the formal deﬁnition for coalitionally rationalizable
strategies in consumer subgames.
Consider a consumer subgame after any sequence of network choices and
price announcement by the ﬁrms. Let Sc denote the strategy space in the
subgame, and let (Sc)i,j denote the set of strategies of consumer i on side j
in this subgame. Let X denote the collection of nonempty product subsets
of Sc. For every j =1 ,2 and i ∈ [0,1], let Ω−i,j be the set of probability
distributions over Sc
−i,j. For every A ∈ X, let Ω−i,j(A)={ω−i,j ∈ Ω−i,j :
R
a−i,j∈A−i,j
ω−i,j(a−i,j)=1 }.F i n a l l y , l e t u
j
i(si,j,ω−j,i) denote the expected
payoﬀ of consumer i on side j i nt h i ss u b g a m ei fh ep l a y ssi,j and his con-
jecture on other consumers’ strategies is ω−i,j ∈ Ω−i,j.
Deﬁnition: B ∈ X is a supported restriction by J ⊂ C1 ∪ C2 given
A ∈ X if
1) Bi,j = Ai,j, ∀ C
j
i / ∈ J, and
2) ∀ C
j
i ∈ J, and ω−i,j ∈ Ω−i,j(A) for which ∃ si,j ∈ Ai,j/Bi,j such
that si,j ∈ BRj(ω−i,j), i ti st h ec a s et h a t
u
j
i(si,j,ω−j,i) < max
t
j
i∈(Sc)ij
u
j
i(t
j
i,τ−j,i) ∀ τ−j,i such that τ−j,i ∈ Ω−j,i(B)
and τC/J = ωC/J.
31The ﬁrst condition above requires that only the strategies of those con-
sumers who are members of the given coalition are restricted. The second
condition requires that, for any player in the coalition, it holds that no
matter what his beliefs are concerning the choices of consumers outside the
coalition, his expected payoﬀ is always strictly higher if the restriction is
made (i.e., if every player in the coalition only chooses from among strate-
gies in B) than if the restriction is not made and it is rational for him to
play some strategy outside the restriction.
Let F(A) denote the set of supported restrictions (by any coalition J).
Deﬁne now the following sequence of sets iteratively: Let A0 = Sc.F o r
k =1 ,2,...,let Ak = ∩
B∈F(Ak−1)
Ak−1. The set of coalitionally rationalizable
s t r a t e g i e si nt h i sc o n s u m e rs u b g a m ei sd e ﬁned to be the intersection of this
decreasing sequence of sets.
For a simple example, consider the following game speciﬁcation: there
are two ﬁrms, and for every j =1 ,2 and i ∈ [0,1], it holds that g
j
i(N−j)=
uN−j for some constant u>0. Consider the subgame that follows price
announcements p
j
1 =0and p
j
2 = u/4 ∀ j =1 ,2.I n w o r d s , n e t w o r k 1
is cheaper than network 2 on both sides of the market. In this subgame,
joining network 1 is a supported restriction for the coalition of all players,
since it yields payoﬀ u to all consumers, while joining network 2 can only
yield a payoﬀ of at most 3u/4 and staying out yields 0. Therefore, the
unique coalitionally rationalizable proﬁle in this game is the one in which
all consumers join network 1.
If consumers are heterogeneous, then the set of coalitionally rationaliz-
able outcomes in a subgame might only be reached after multiple rounds
of agreements. Consider the following game speciﬁcation: there are two
ﬁrms, consumers have linear utility functions, u1
i =1i ∈ [0,1/2],u 1
i =1 /2
i ∈ (1/2,1] and u2
i =1i ∈ [0,1]. In words, consumers on side 2 are
homogeneous, while half of the consumers on side 1 have relatively low
reservation values. Consider the subgame following price announcements
p1
1 = .4,p 2
1 = .8 and p1
2 = .8,p 2
2 = .4. Initially, there is no supported
restriction for the coalition of all consumers. Consumers would prefer to
coordinate their network choices, but coordinating on network 1 is better
for side 1 consumers, while coordinating on network 2 is better for side 2
consumers. However, note that joining network 2 is not rationalizable for
any consumer C1
i for i ∈ (1/2,1]. Once it is established that players C1
i for
i ∈ (1/2,1] only consider the strategies not joining any network or joining
32network 1, it is a supported restriction for the coalition of all consumers to
join network 1.
10 Appendix B: proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Using the fact that consumers’ utility functions are continuous in the
price of networks they join, it is straightforward to establish that there exists
a Nash equilibrium with one network in which the monopolist’s proﬁti s
higher than in any other Nash equilibrium with one network. Let s be such a
Nash equilibrium. Given that g
j
i is strictly increasing for every j ∈ {1,2} and
i ∈ [0,1], πM(s) > 0. This implies that in s at least on one side of the market
the monopolist charges a strictly positive price and has a strictly positive
market share. Let c Cj(s)={C
j
i : c
j
i(s) 6= ∅} for j =1 ,2. Then for C
j
i ∈ c Cj(s)
and Nj ∈ [0,1], it holds that g
j
i(N−j(s)) − pj(s) > 0. Then for every ε>0
and C
j
i ∈ c Cj(s),i th o l d st h a tg
j
i(N
−j
1 (s))−pj(s)+ε>0, which implies that if
the monopolist establishes one network and sets prices
¡
p1(s) − ε,p2(s) − ε
¢
,
in the resulting subgame joining the network is a supported restriction for
c C1(s)∪ c C2(s).
We use this result to show that the monopolist can get a proﬁt arbitrarily
close to πM(s) given that consumers are coalitionally rational. If pj(s) ≥ 0
for j =1 ,2, then the ﬁrm can get a proﬁt arbitrarily close to πM(s) by
establishing one network and charging prices
¡
p1(s) − ε,p2(s) − ε
¢
for small
enough ε>0. If pj(s) > 0 and p−j(s) < 0, it has to be the case that
Nj(s) > 0 and N−j(s)=1 . Then, by establishing one network and setting
prices
¡
p1(s) − ε,p2(s) − ε
¢
, the monopolist gets market shares Nj ≥ Nj(s)
and N−j =1and again its proﬁt can be arbitrarily close to πM(s).
The above implies that the monopolist’s proﬁt in any coalition perfect
equilibrium cannot be strictly lower than πM(s).Q E D
Proof of Theorem 2 It is easy to check that if the conditions of the
theorem hold, then in the maximum proﬁt Nash equilibrium with one net-
work pj = uj (j ∈ {1,2}). Consider now a Nash equilibrium in which there
are two networks and there is a positive fraction of consumers at both of
them. Then for a positive fraction of consumers, it holds that the number
of consumers on the other side of the same network is strictly less than 1.
Without loss of generality, assume that N1
1 > 0 and N2
1 < 1 in the equilib-
rium at hand. Then p1
1 <u 1; otherwise consumers on side 1 would prefer
not joining any network to joining network 1. Furthermore, N
j
k > 0 implies
33p
j
k ≤ uj for j,k ∈ {1,2}, again because otherwise consumers on side j would
prefer not joining any network to joining network k. The above imply that
πM <u 1 + u2 in the Nash equilibrium at hand, so by Theorem 1 it cannot
be a coalition perfect equilibrium. QED
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3In the subgame following price announcements
(l,l), every consumer joining the network is a coalitionally rationalizable
Nash equilibrium, which gives a proﬁto f2l to the monopolist. In the sub-
game following price announcements (al,h), it is a coalitionally rationaliz-
able Nash equilibrium if all consumers from side 1 and high types from side
2 join the network, which gives a proﬁto fa(h+l) to the monopolist. In the
subgame following price announcements (ah,ah), it is a coalitionally ratio-
nalizable Nash equilibrium if high types from both sides join the network,
which gives a proﬁto f2a2h to the monopolist.
Suppose 2a2h>a l+ah. Since a>0,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o(2a−1)h>l .
The latter implies a2h>lsince a2h−(2a−1)h =( a−1)2h>0. Therefore
(2a − 1)h>limplies that 2a2h>max(2l,ah + al).
Suppose now that ah + al < 2l. It is equivalent to l> a
2−ah. The latter
implies l>a 2h since a
2−ah − a2h = ah1−2a+a2
2−a > 0. Therefore 2a2h<2l.
This establishes that if l> a
2−ah,t h e n2l>max(2a2h,ah + al).
Note that (2a−1)h< a
2−ah. If l ∈ ((2a−1)h, a
2−ah),t h e n2a2h<a l+ah
and ah + al > 2l and therefore ah + al > max(2l,2a2h).
It is straightforward to show that there is no Nash equilibrium in which
πM is larger than max(2l,2a2h,a(h + l)). Then the theorem follows from
the above results and Theorem 1. QED
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4In any coalition perfect equilibrium, in the sub-
game following the ﬁrm establishing two networks and setting prices p1
1 =
p2
2 = la − ε, p2
1 = p1
2 = la +( 1− a)h − 2ε (ε>0), it has to hold that
c1
i =2 ,c 2
i =1∀ i ∈ [0,a] and c1
i =1 ,c 2
i =2∀ i ∈ (a,1].T os e et h i s ,d e ﬁne
A ⊂ S such that A = ×
i∈[0,1],j=1,2
A
j
i and A
j
i ≡ {∅,1,2} ∀ i ∈ [0,a], j =1 ,2,
A1
i ≡ {∅,1} ∀ i ∈ (a,1] and A2
i ≡ {∅,2} ∀ i ∈ (a,1].A l s o d e ﬁne B ⊂ S
such that B = ×
i∈[0,1],j=1,2
B
j
i and B1
i ≡ {2} ∀ i ∈ [0,a], B2
i ≡ {1} ∀ i ∈ [0,a],
j =1 ,2, B1
i ≡ {1} ∀ i ∈ (a,1],a n dB2
i ≡ {2} ∀ i ∈ (a,1]. First note that
for any i ∈ [0,1] and j ∈ {1,2}, A
j
i × S−1,i is a supported restriction by C
j
i
given S, since strategies in S
j
i/A
j
i are never best responses for consumer i
on side j. Next, B is a supported restriction given A by C1 ∪ C2 since it
gives the best possible payoﬀ to every consumer in this subgame, given A.
34Therefore c1
i =2 ,c 2
i =1∀ i ∈ [0,a] and c1
i =1 ,c 2
i =2∀ i ∈ (a,1] is the
only coalitionally rationalizable strategy in the above subgame.
Since ε can be arbitrarily small positive, the above establishes that if
s ∈ S is a coalition perfect equilibrium, then πM(s) ≥ 2(la+(1−a)ah) ≡ π∗.
Suppose there exists a coalition perfect equilibrium s ∈ S such that
πM(s) >π ∗.
First suppose that the number of networks established by the ﬁrm in
s is 1.I f l ∈
³
(4a − 1)h, a
2−ah
´
, then by Theorem 3, πM(s) ≤ (l + h)a.
But for l>(4a − 1)h, it holds that (l + h)a<2(la +( 1− a)ah) ≡ π∗,a
contradiction. If l ∈
³
( a
2−ah,
a(1−2a)
1−a h
´
,t h e nb yT h e o r e m2πM(s) ≤ 2l.
But l<
a(1−2a)
1−a h implies 2l<2(la+( 1− a)ah) ≡ π∗, a contradiction. Next
suppose that the number of networks established by the ﬁrm in s is 2.I t
cannot be that N
j
k(s)=0for some j =1 ,2 and k =1 ,2 since then either
N
−j
k (s)=0or p
−j
k (s) ≤ 0 (otherwise consumers choosing network k in s
would get negative utility, contradicting that s is a Nash equilibrium). In
either case, πM(s) is smaller or equal to the supremum of proﬁts attainable
by a strategy in which the monopolist operates only one network. Then, as
established above, πM(s) <π ∗.T h e r e f o r eN
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j =1 ,2 and k =1 ,2.
Let Hj and Lj denote high a low type consumers on side j.L e t X
j
k
denote the consumers on side j who join network k in s.
First we establish that it cannot be that for some j =1 ,2 both X
j
1∩Lj =
∅ and X
j
2 ∩Lj = ∅.I fX
j
1 ∩Lj = ∅ and X
j
2 ∩Lj = ∅∀j =1 ,2,t h e nπM(s) <
2a2h<π ∗. Otherwise, w.l.o.g. assume X2
1 ∩ L2 = ∅ and X2
2 ∩ L2 = ∅ and
X1
2 ∩ L1 6= ∅.L e t b p1 =m a x ( 0 ,p 1
1(s)
N2
1(s)+N2
2(s)
N2
2(s) ) and b p2 =m a x ( 0 ,p 2
2(s)).
Consider a deviation s0 by the ﬁrm such that the ﬁrm establishes one network
and sets prices p1(s0)=b p1−ε and p2(s0)=b p2−ε. In the subgame following
the above prices, it is a supported restriction for X1
1∪X1
2∪X2
1∪X2
2 (note that
X1
2 ∩ L1 6= ∅ and therefore p1
1(s) ≤ lN2
2)t oc h o o s e1. Therefore, deviating
this way the ﬁrm can get a proﬁt arbitrarily close to π0 ≡ b p1(N1
1(s)+
N1
2(s)) + b p2(N2
1(s)+N2
2(s)). Let b b p
1
=m a x ( 0 ,p 2
1(s)
N2
1(s)+N2
2(s)
N2
1(s) ) and b b p
2
=
max(0,p 2
1(s)). Consider now deviation s00 by the ﬁrm such that one network
is established, and priced such that p1(s00)=b b p
1
− ε and p2(s00)=b b p
2
− ε.
In the subgame following the above prices, it is a supported restriction for
X1
2 ∪ X2
1 ∪ X2
2 to choose 1. Therefore, deviating this way the ﬁrm can
get a proﬁt arbitrarily close to π00 ≡ b b p
1
N1
2(s)+ b b p
2
(N2
1(s)+N2
2(s)). It is
straightforward to verify that both π0 +π00 > 2πM(s), and therefore at least
one of the above deviations yields higher proﬁtt h a nπM(s). And since
35nA(s0)=1and nA(s00)=1 ,i th o l d st h a tπ0 <π ∗ and π00 <π ∗, and therefore
πM(s) <π ∗.
Next we establish that it cannot be that for some j =1 ,2 both X
j
1∩Lj 6=
∅ and X
j
2 ∩ Lj 6= ∅.I f X
j
1 ∩ Lj 6= ∅ and X
j
2 ∩ Lj 6= ∅∀j =1 ,2 then
p
j
k(s) ≤ lN
−j
k (s) ∀ k =1 ,2 and j =1 ,2.T h e nπM(s) < 2l<π ∗. Otherwise
w.l.o.g. assume X1
1 ∩L1 6= ∅, X1
2 ∩L1 6= ∅ and X2
1 ∩L2 6= ∅.T h e nπM(s) <
(h + l)N1
1(s)N2
2(s)+2 lN2
1(s)N1
2(s),s i n c ep1
1(s) ≤ lN2
2(s), p1
2(s) ≤ lN1
2(s),
p2
1(s) ≤ lN1
1(s) and p2
2(s) <h N 1
2(s).N o t et h a t(h+l)N2
2(s) < (h+l)a<π ∗
and therefore (h + l)N2
2(s) < (h + l)N1
1(s)N2
2(s)+2 lN2
1(s)N1
2(s).T h i s
implies (h + l)N2
2(s) < 2lN2
1(s) < 2l.F u r t h e r m o r e , 2l<π ∗ and therefore
2l<(h+l)N1
1(s)N2
2(s)+2lN2
1(s)N1
2(s). This implies 2l(1−N2
1(s)N1
2(s)) <
(h+l)N1
1(s)N2
2(s) which implies 2lN1
1(s) < (h+l)N1
1(s)N2
2(s) which implies
2l<(h + l)N2
2(s), a contradiction.
Finally we establish that it cannot be that for some k =1 ,2 both X1
k ∩
L1 6= ∅ and X2
k ∩ L2 6= ∅. Suppose otherwise. Then, as established above,
X1
−k ∩ L1 = ∅ and X2
−k ∩ L2 = ∅, but X1
−k 6= ∅ and X2
−k 6= ∅.T h i si m p l i e s
N
−j
k (s)l − p
j
k(s) ≥ N
−j
−k(s)l − p
j
−k(s) ∀ j =1 ,2 and N
−j
k (s)h − p
j
k(s) ≤
N
−j
−k(s)h− p
j
−k(s) ∀ j =1 ,2, which implies p
j
k(s) ≤ p
j
−k(s) ∀ j =1 ,2.T h e n
p
j
k(s)=p
j
−k(s) for some j =1 ,2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,p
j
k(s) ≤ N
−j
k (s)l<l .T h e n
it is straightforward to establish that one of the following deviations are
proﬁtable for the ﬁrm for small enough ε: either establishing one network
and setting prices p =( l − ε,l − ε), or establishing one network and setting
prices p =( p1
−k(s) − ε,p2
−k(s) − ε).
The above implies ∃ k ∈ {1,2} such that X1
k ∩H1 = X1
k and X2
−k∩H2 =
X2
k. W.l.o.g. let k =1 .
Note that p2
1(s) ≤ lN1
1 and p1
2(s) ≤ lN2
2(s) since X2
1 ∩L2 6= ∅, X1
2 ∩L1 6=
∅ a n db yd e ﬁnition no consumer can get negative utility in any subgame
if s is played. Then hN2
1(s) − p1
1(s) ≥ hN2
2(s) − p1
2(s) implies p1
1(s) ≤
lN2
2(s)+h(1−N2
2(s)) and hN1
2(s)−p2
2(s) ≥ hN1
1(s)−p2
1(s) implies p2
2(s) ≤
lN1
1(s)+h(1 − N1
1(s)). This establishes that
πM(s) ≤ l(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s)) + h(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s) − 2N1
1(s)N2
2(s)).
Note that
∂(l(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s))+h(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s)−2N1
1(s)N2
2(s)))
∂N1
1
= h+l−2hN2
2(s) ≥
h+l−2ha > 0 (since the starting assumptions imply a<1/2). Similarly it
holds that
∂(l(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s))+h(N1
1(s)+N2
2(s)−2N1
1(s)N2
2(s)))
∂N2
2
= h + l − 2hN1
1(s) ≥
h + l − 2ha > 0. Therefore πM(s) <l 2a + h(2a − 2a2)=π∗ unless p2
1(s)=
p1
2(s)=al, N2
1(s)=N1
2(s)=1− a, p1
1(s)=p2
2(s)=la + h(1 − a) and
N1
1(s)=N2
2(s)=a.Q E D
36Lemma 5.1 Consider a consumer subgame in which there are two net-
works, and prices are (p1
1,p 2
1) and (p1
2,p 2
2). If p
j
k <p
j
−k ∀ j =1 ,2 for some
k ∈ {1,2},t h e n −k is not a coalitionally rationalizable strategy in the
subgame for any consumer. If also p
j
k <u
j
i ∀ j ∈ {1,2} and i ∈ [0,1],t h e n
k is the unique coalitionally rationalizable strategy in the subgame for all
consumers.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . 1Let R−k be the set of consumers for whom −k
is rationalizable in the subgame. Then p
j
k <p
j
−k ∀ j =1 ,2 implies that the
restriction {k} is supported by R−k in the subgame. The second claim in
the lemma then follows from the fact that p
j
k <u
j
i ∀ j ∈ {1,2} and i ∈ [0,1]
implies R−k = C.Q E D
Lemma 5.2 Assume there is one ﬁrm in the market. Suppose s is a
coalition perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist establishes two net-
works. Then it cannot be that both N1
1(s)p1
1(s)+N1
2(s)p1
2(s) ≤ 0 and
N2
1(s)p2
1(s)+N2
2(s)p2
2(s) ≤ 0. Similarly, it cannot be that both N1
1(s)p1
1(s)+
N2
1(s))p2
1(s) ≤ 0 and N1
2(s)p1
2(s)+N2
2(s))p2
2(s) ≤ 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . 2By Theorem 1, in any coalition perfect equilib-
rium the monopolist gets at least the maximum possible proﬁtt h a tc a nb e
obtained in equilibrium with one network. Simple arguments establish that
the latter is larger than 0, which implies the claims. QED
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium such that
the monopolist establishes two networks, and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}.B y
Lemma 5.1 there exists j such that p
j
1(s) ≥ p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s) ≤ p
−j
2 (s).
Suppose that p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s)=p
−j
2 (s).S i n c e s is a Nash
equilibrium and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2},i tm u s tb et h a tN1
1(s)=N1
2(s)
and N2
1(s)=N2
2(s). Then Lemma 5.2 implies that for small enough ε>
0,i ti sp r o ﬁtable for the monopolist to deviate to establishing only one
network and setting prices pj =m a x ( 0 ,p
j
1(s)+δj(N
−j
1 ,2N
−j
1 )) − ε, p−j =
max(0,p
−j
1 (s)+δ−j(N
j
1,2N
j
1)) − ε, given that consumers are coalitionally
rational in the resulting subgame (where δj() and δ−j() denote the universal
lower bounds on incremental utilities from A1). This is because given the
above assumptions, all consumers who join some network in s join network
1 after the prescribed deviation.
The above imply that there exists j such that p
j
1(s) >p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s) ≤
p
−j
2 (s).S i n c es is a Nash equilibrium and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2},i tm u s t
be that N
−j
1 (s) >N
−j
2 (s) and N
j
1(s) ≤ N
j
2(s).Q E D
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium such that
37the monopolist establishes two networks, and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}.B y
Lemma 5.1 there exists j such that p
j
1(s) ≥ p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s) ≤ p
−j
2 (s).
Suppose that p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s)=p
−j
2 (s).S i n c e s is a Nash
equilibrium and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2},i tm u s tb et h a tN1
1(s)=N1
2(s)
and N2
1(s)=N2
2(s). Lemma 5.2 implies that at least one of p
j
1(s) > 0 and
p
−j
1 (s) > 0 holds. Then for small enough ε>0,i ti sp r o ﬁtable for the
monopolist to deviate to establishing only one network and setting prices
pj =2 p
j
1(s) − ε, p−j =m a x ( 0 ,2p
−j
1 (s)) − ε, given that consumers are coali-
tionally rational in the resulting subgame. This is because given the above
assumptions, all consumers who join some network in s join network 1 after
the prescribed deviation.
Suppose next that p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) ≡ b pj and p
−j
1 (s) >p
−j
2 (s).S i n c e
s is a Nash equilibrium and N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2},i tm u s tb et h a t
N
−j
1 (s)=N
−j
2 (s) ≡ N−j and N
j
1(s) >N
j
2(s). If p
−j
1 (s) ≤ 0,t h e nL e m m a
5.2 implies that a deviation which involves establishing one network and
pricing it such that p−j = −ε, pj =2 p
j
1(s)−ε is proﬁtable for small enough
ε, given that consumers are coalitionally rational in the resulting subgame.
Therefore, it has to be that p
−j
1 (s) > 0.I f
N
j
2(s)
N
j
1(s)p
−j
1 (s) >p
−j
2 (s) then
(N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s))b pj+2p
−j
1 (s)N−j >N
j
1(s)b pj+N
j
2(s)b pj+p
−j
1 (s)N−j+p
−j
2 N−j.
Note that the right hand side of the above inequality is the proﬁtt h e
monopolist gets in s, while the left hand side is a proﬁt level that can
be approximated arbitrarily closely by a deviation in which the monopo-
list establishes one network and sets prices such that pj = b pj − ε, p−j =
N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)
N
j
1(s) p
−j
1 (s) − ε, given that consumers are coalitionally rational in
the resulting subgame and utility functions are convex. This is because
the above assumptions imply that all consumers on side j who join net-
work 1 in s join network 1 after the above deviation, too. This contra-
dicts that s is a coalition perfect equilibrium. Therefore, it has to be that
N
j
2(s)
N
j
1(s)p
−j
1 (s) ≤ p
−j
2 (s). Note that this in particular implies p
−j
2 (s) > 0.T h e n
2N
j
1(s)pj+2N
j
2(s)pj+N
−j
1 (s)p
−j
2 (s)
N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)
N
j
2(s)
+N
−j
2 (s)p
−j
2 (s)
N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)
N
j
2(s)
>N
j
1(s)pj + N
j
2(s)pj + p
−j
1 (s)N−j + p
−j
2 N−j.
Note that the right hand side of this inequality is the proﬁtt h em o -
nopolist gets in s,w h i l et h el e f th a n ds i d ei sap r o ﬁt level that can be
38approximated arbitrarily closely by a deviation in which the monopolist
establishes one network and sets prices such that pj =2 b pj − ε, p−j =
p
−j
2 (s)
N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)
N
j
2(s) −ε, given that consumers are coalitionally rational in the
resulting subgame and utility functions are convex (implying that all con-
sumers on side j who join some network in s join network 1 after the above
deviation).
This concludes that there exists j such that p
j
1(s) >p
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s) <
p
−j
2 (s). Then equilibrium conditions for the consumers imply N
j
1(s) <N
j
2(s)
and N
−j
1 (s) >N
−j
2 (s).Q E D
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7Suppose ∃ s ∈ S such that s is a coalition perfect
equilibrium in which the monopolist establishes two networks and N
j
k(s) > 0
∀ j ∈ {1,2} and k ∈ {A,B}.
By Theorem 6 ∃ k ∈ {1,2} such that p1
k(s) <p 1
−k(s) and p2
k(s) >p 2
−k(s).
Let l1 =( N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)) inf
i∈[0,1]:c
j
i(s)=k
g1
i (N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)),
h1 =( N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)) inf
i∈[0,1]:c
j
i(s)=−k
g1
i (N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)),
l2 =( N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)) inf
i∈[0,1]:c
j
i(s)=−k
g2
i (N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)) and let h2 =
(N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)) inf
i∈[0,1]:c
j
i(s)=k
g2
i (N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)).S i n c e s is a Nash equi-
librium and utility functions are convex, p1
k(s) ≤ 1
N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)l1 N2
k(s)
N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)
and p2
−k(s) ≤ 1
N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)l2 N1
k(s)
N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s) (otherwise consumers on side 1
who join k and consumers on side 2 who join −k in s would be better oﬀ not
joining any network). Similarly, p1
−k(s) ≤ 1
N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)h1 N2
−k(s)−N2
k(s)
N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)+p1
k(s)
and p2
k(s) ≤ 1
N2
k(s)+N2
−k(s)h2 N1
k(s)−N1
−k(s)
N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s) + p2
−k(s) (otherwise consumers on
side 1 who join −k and consumers on side 2 who join k in s would be
better oﬀ switching networks). Let x1 = N1
−k(s)/(N1
k(s)+N1
−k(s)) and
x2 = N2
k(s)/ (N2
−k(s)+N2
k(s)).T h e nπM(s) ≤ x2l1(1−x1)+((1−2x2)h1+
x2l1)x1 + x1l2(1 − x2)+( ( 1− 2x1)h2 + x1h2)x2
= h1x1 + h2x2 + l1x2 + l2x1 − 2h1x1x2 − 2h2x1x2.I t i s e a s y t o v e r i f y
that the latter expression is maximized at x1 = h2+l1
2h1+2h2, x2 = h1+l1
2h1+2h2.
Substituting these values into the expression yields πM(s) ≤ (h1+l2)(h2+l1)
2(h1+h2) .
Let b C(s)={C
j
i ∈ C : c
j
i(s) 6= ∅}. Consider a deviation by the mo-
nopolist in which only one network is established and prices are set such
that pj = 1
N
j
k(s)+N
j
−k(s)lj − ε ∀ j ∈ {1,2},w h e r eε>0. The proﬁto ft h e
39monopolist after this deviation is at least l1 + l2 − ε(
P
j=1,2
P
k=1,2
N
j
k(s)),g i v e n
that consumers play coalitionally rationalizable strategies in the resulting
subgame and their utility functions are convex (since then joining the net-
work is a supported restriction for the coalition b C(s)). Since ε can be taken
arbitrarily small, the above implies that πM(s) ≥ l1 +l2, which can only be
if (h1+l2)(h2+l1)
2(h1+h2) ≥ l1 + l2.
It is straightforward to verify that for any h1 +h2 = h>0 and l1 +l2 =
l>0 the expression
(h1+l2)(h2+l1)
2(h1+h2) − l1 − l2 is maximized at h1 = h2 = h/2,
l1 = l2 = l/2.I n t h a t c a s e ,
(h1+l2)(h2+l1)
2(h1+h2) − l1 − l2 = h2 − 6hl + l2.H e n c e
a coalition perfect equilibrium with two active networks can only exists
if h2 − 6hl + l2 ≥ 0. Given that h>l ,this implies h ≥ (3 + 2
√
2)l.
Therefore, if the dispersion of utilities on both sides of the market is less
than (3 + 2
√
2), then there cannot exist a coalition perfect euilibrium with
two active networks. QED
Lemma 8.1 Let there be two ﬁrms in the market. In the subgame
following price announcements (0,0), (0,0) strategy ∅ is not coalitionally
rationalizable for any C
j
i ∈ C.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 . 1In this subgame, {1,2} is a supported restriction
for C, since for any consumer (on either side of the market) and for any
belief the consumer might have that is compatible with all other consumers
playing according to the restriction, at least one of 1 or 2 gives a strictly
positive payoﬀ,w h i l e∅ gives a zero payoﬀ.Q E D
Lemma 8.2 Let there be two ﬁrms in the market, and assume that s
is a coalition perfect equilibrium. If N
j
1(s) > 0 for some j ∈ {1,2} and
N1
2(s)=N2
2(s)=0 ,t h e n( i )p1
1(s)=−p2
1(s),( i i )p
j
1(s) ≤ uj ∀ j ∈ {1,2}
and (iii) N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=1 . Similarly, if N
j
2(s) > 0 for some j ∈ {1,2} and
N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=0 ,t h e n( i )p1
2(s)=−p2
2(s),( i i )p
j
2(s) ≤ uj ∀ j ∈ {1,2} and
(iii) N1
2(s)=N2
2(s)=1 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 . 2Note that N1
2(s)=N2
2(s)=0implies π2(s)=0 .
Suppose p
j
1(s) >u j for some j ∈ {1,2}.T h e n N
j
1(s)=0since consumers
cannot get negative utility in s.T h e nN
−j
1 (s) > 0 implies that p
−j
1 (s) ≤ 0,
again because consumers cannot get negative utility in s.S i n c eﬁrm 1 cannot
have negative proﬁti ns,t h i si m p l i e sp
−j
1 (s)=0 . Consider the deviation
(u1 −ε,−ε) by ﬁrm 2, where ε>0. In the subgame following this deviation
it is a supported restriction for C1∪C2 to play 2, because that proﬁle yields
the highest possible payoﬀ in this subgame for every C
j
i ∈ C, and choosing
401 or ∅ yields a strictly smaller payoﬀ than this maximum no matter what
strategies other consumers play. Then if consumers are coalitionally rational,
then ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt after this deviation is u−2ε, which is positive for small
enough proﬁts, a contradiction. This concludes that p
j
1(s) ≤ uj ∀ k =1 ,2.
Suppose now that p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) > 0. Consider the deviation (p1
1(s) −
ε,p2
1(s) − ε) by ﬁrm 2, where ε>0. By Lemma 5.1 after this deviation all
consumers choose 2, therefore ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti sp1
1(s)+p2
1(s) − 2ε, which is
positive for small enough ε, a contradiction. This concludes that p1
1(s)+
p2
1(s) ≤ 0.
Suppose now that p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) < 0.T h i si m p l i e sp
j
1(s) < 0 for some j ∈
{1,2}. Then N
j
2(s)=0implies N
j
1(s)=1 ,s i n c e1 strictly dominates ∅ for
side 1 consumers. But then p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) < 0 implies π1(s)=p1
1(s)N1
1(s)+
p2
1(s)N2
1(s) < 0, a contradiction. This concludes that p1
1(s)+p2
1(s)=0 .
Consider now p1
1(s)=p2
1(s)=0 .T h e nπ1(s)=0 . If p
j
2(s) < 0 for some
j ∈ {1,2}, then ∅ is a strictly dominated strategy for side j consumers,
and therefore N
j
2(s)=0implies N
j
1(s)=1 . Then choosing 1 yields utility
u−j > 0 for side −j consumers, and therefore N
−j
2 (s)=0implies N
−j
1 (s)=
1. Suppose now that p1
2(s) > 0 and p2
2(s)=0 . Then by Lemma 5.1, a
deviation min(u − ε,p1
B(s) − ε),−ε by ﬁrm 1 for ε>0 guarantees that all
consumers choose 1, which for small enough ε yields positive proﬁtf o rﬁrm
1, contradicting that s is an equilibrium. A symmetric argument rules out
that p1
2(s)=0and p2
2(s) > 0.I fp1
2(s)=p2
2(s)=0 , then Lemma 8.1 implies
that N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1∀ j ∈ {1,2},a n dt h e nN1
2(s)=N2
2(s)=0implies
N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=1 .Q E D
Lemma 8.3 Let there be two ﬁrms in the market, and assume that
u
j
i = uj ∀ j ∈ {1,2} and i ∈ [0,1].L e ts be a coalition perfect equilibrium
such that N
j
1(s) > 0 for some j ∈ {1,2} and N
j
2(s) > 0 for some j ∈ {1,2}.
Then p1
1(s)=p1
2(s)=−p2
1(s)=−p2
2(s) and p
j
1(s) ≤ uj ∀ j ∈ {1,2}.
Moreover, N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=N1
2(s)=N2
2(s)=1 /2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 . 3Suppose p
j
k(s) >u j for some j,k ∈ {1,2}.
W.l.o.g. assume p1
1(s) >u 1.T h e n N1
1(s)=0and therefore N2
1(s) > 0.
This is only compatible with s being a Nash equilibrium if p2
1(s)=0 .T h e n
by Lemma 5.1 a price announcement (u1 − ε,−ε) by ﬁrm 2 for ε>0 guar-
antees that all consumers choose 2, which for small enough ε yields positive
proﬁtf o rﬁrm 2. Therefore π1(s)=0and π2(s) > 0. The latter can
only be if both N1
2(s) > 0 and N2
2(s) > 0, which imply that p
j
2(s) ≤ uj ∀
j ∈ {1,2}. Then by Lemma 5.1, a deviation (p1
2(s) − ε,p2
2(s) − ε) by ﬁrm
1f o rε>0 guarantees that all consumers choose 1. For small enough ε,
this deviation proﬁti sc l o s et op1
2(s)+p2
2(s).I f p
j
2(s) ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ {1,2},
41then π2(s) > 0 implies p1
2(s)+p2
2(s) > 0, which implies that the above
deviation is proﬁtable for small enough ε.I f p2
2(s) ≤ 0,t h e nπ2(s) > 0
implies N1
2(s) > 0, but then N2
1(s) > 0 contradicts that every consumer
plays a best response in s. Therefore p2
2(s) > 0.I fp1
2(s) < 0 and p2
2(s) > 0,
then N1
2(s)=1since 2 is the unique best response after the equilibrium
price announcements for side 1 consumers, and therefore p1
2(s)+p2
2(s) ≥
p1
2(s)N1
2(s)+p2
2(s)N2
2(s)=π2(s) > 0. This implies that the above deviation
for ﬁrm 1 is proﬁtable for small enough ε, contradicting that s is a Nash
equilibrium. This concludes that p
j
k(s) ≤ uj ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}.
Suppose p
j
1(s) 6= p
j
2(s) for some j ∈ {1,2}. W.l.o.g. assume p1
1(s) >
p1
2(s).T h e np2
1(s) ≤ p2
2(s), otherwise Lemma 5.1 implies N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=0 .
Suppose ﬁrst that N1
1(s)=N1
2(s)=0 . Then N2
1(s) > 0 and N2
2(s) > 0.T h i s
is only compatible with consumers being in equilibrium and ﬁrms not getting
negative proﬁti fp2
1(s)=p2
2(s)=0 .T h e n π2(s)=0 . T h e nb yL e m m a
5.1, a deviation min(u − ε,p1
1(s) − ε),−ε by B for ε>0 guarantees that
all consumers choose 1,w h i c hf o rs m a l le n o u g hε yields positive proﬁtf o r
ﬁrm 2, contradicting that s is an equilibrium. Suppose next that N2
1(s)=
N2
2(s)=0 . Then N1
1(s) > 0 and N1
2(s) > 0, which contradicts that s is
a Nash equilibrium, since N2
1(s)=N2
2(s)=0and p1
1(s) >p 1
2(s) implies
that for any consumer on side 1, given the other players’ strategies, 2 is
a better response than 1 in the subgame following the equilibrium price
announcements in s. This concludes that N1
k(s) > 0 for some k ∈ {1,2} and
N1
k(s) > 0 for some k ∈ {1,2}.T h e nN1
1(s) ≤ N1
2(s) and N2
1(s) >N 2
2(s),
otherwise p1
1(s) >p 1
2(s) and p2
1(s) ≤ p2
2(s) imply that some consumers are
not playing a best response in s. Consider now following two deviations.
The ﬁrst is (p1
2(s) − ε,p2
2(s) − ε) by ﬁrm 1, and the second is (p1
1(s) −
ε,p2
1(s) − ε) by ﬁrm 2. Since p
j
k(s) ≤ uk ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}, lemma 5.1 implies
that after the ﬁrst deviation all consumers choose 1, and after the second
deviation all consumers choose 2. Then the ﬁrst deviation yields a proﬁt
p1
2(s)+p2
2(s) − 2ε to ﬁrm 1, while the second one yields p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) − 2ε
to ﬁrm 2. The sum of these deviation proﬁts is p1
1(s)+p2
1(s)+p1
2(s)+
p2
2(s) − 4ε. The sum of the two ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts is N1
1(s)p1
1(s)+
N2
1(s)p2
1(s)+N1
2(s)p1
2(s)+N2
2(s)p2
2(s) ≡ π∗.N o t et h a tp1
2(s) < 0 implies that
N1
1(s)+N2
1(s)=1 , since then ∅ is never a best response for any consumer
on side 1. Similarly, p2
1(s) < 0 implies that N1
2(s)+N2
2(s)=1 .T h e n b y
N1
1(s) ≤ N1
2(s), N2
1(s) >N 2
2(s), p1
1(s) >p 1
2(s) and p2
1(s) ≤ p2
2(s),i th a st o
hold that N1
1(s)p1
1(s)+N2
1(s)p2
1(s)+N1
2(s)p1
2(s)+N2
2(s)p2
2(s) < 1
2(p1
1(s)+
p2
1(s)+p1
2(s)+p2
2(s)). The left hand side of this inequality is nonnegative (it
is the sum of equilibrium proﬁts); therefore the right hand side is positive,
42which implies that also N1
1(s)p1
2(s)+N2
1(s)p2
1(s)+N1
2(s)p1
2(s)+N2
2(s)p2
2(s)
<p 1
1(s)+p2
1(s)+p1
2(s)+p2
2(s). This implies that for small enough ε,t h e
sum of the two deviation proﬁts above is larger than the sum of the two
equilibrium proﬁts, implying that at least one of the deviations is proﬁtable,
a contradiction. This concludes that p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2}.
Suppose that π1(s)+π2(s) > 0. W.l.o.g. assume π1(s) ≥ π2(s).T h e n
π2(s) <p 1
1(s)+p2
1(s) ≤ π1(s)+π2(s) (note that p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2},
and that p
j
1(s) < 0 implies that c
j
i(s) 6= ∅∀j ∈ {1,2} and i ∈ [0,1]). By
Lemma 5.1, a deviation p1
1(s) − ε,p2
1(s) − ε by ﬁrm 2 for ε>0 guarantees
that all consumers choose 2, which yields a proﬁto fp1
1(s)+p2
1(s) − 2ε to
ﬁrm 2. This implies that the above deviation is proﬁtable for small enough
ε, a contradiction. Then π1(s)+π2(s) ≤ 0 and since equilibrium proﬁts
have to be nonnegative, π1(s)=π2(s)=0 . Suppose p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) > 0.B y
Lemma 5.1, a deviation p1
1(s) − ε,p2
1(s) − ε by ﬁrm 2 for ε>0 guarantees
that all consumers choose 2, which yields a proﬁto fp1
1(s)+p2
1(s) − 2ε to
ﬁrm 2. But for small enough ε,t h i sp r o ﬁt is positive, which contradicts that
π2(s)=0and that s is an equilibrium. This concludes that p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) ≤ 0.
Suppose p1
1(s)+p2
1(s) < 0.T h e n p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) < 0 for some j ∈ {1,2}.
Then N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1 ,s i n c e∅ is never a best response for any consumer
on side j i nt h es u b g a m ea f t e rt h ee q u i l i b rium price announcements. But
then min(π1(s),π2(s)) < 0, contradicting that s is a Nash equilibrium. This
concludes that p1
1(s)+p2
1(s)=0 .I fp
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) < 0 for some j ∈ {1,2},
then N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1 . Then nonnegativity of equilibrium proﬁts implies
that also N
−j
1 (s)+N
−j
2 (s)=1and that N1
1(s)=N2
1(s),N 1
2(s)=N2
2(s).I f
p1
1(s)=p1
2(s)=p2
1(s)=p2
2(s)=0 , then by Lemma 5.1, Nk
1(s)+Nk
2(s)=1
∀ k =1 ,2.A s s h o w n a b o v e , N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s) > 0 ∀ j ∈ {1,2}.T h e n
p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2} implies N
j
1(s)=N
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2}.T h i si m p l i e s
π1(s)=π2(s).I f p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) < 0 for some j ∈ {1,2}, then the above
implies that N
j
1(s)=N
j
2(s)=1 /2. Then p1
1(s)+p2
1(s)=0and nonnegativity
of equilibrium proﬁts together imply that also N
−j
1 (s)=N
−j
2 (s)=1 /2. If
p1
1(s)=p1
2(s)=p2
1(s)=p2
2(s)=0 ,t h e nN
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1∀ j ∈ {1,2}
and the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium imply that N
j
1(s)=N
j
2(s)=1 /2
∀ j ∈ {1,2}.Q E D
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3 establish that there are
no other coalition perfect equilibria with one or two active ﬁrms than those
stated in the claim. All that remains to be shown is that there is no coalition
perfect equilibrium with no active ﬁrm.
Suppose N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=0∀ j ∈ {1,2}.T h e n π1(s)=π2(s)=0 .
43If p
j
k(s) < 0 for some j,k ∈ {1,2},t h e nN
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1 ,s i n c e∅ is a
never best response strategy for any consumer on side j, a contradiction.
Suppose now that ∃ k ∈ {1,2} such that p1
k(s),p 2
k(s) ≥ 0,a n dp
j
k(s) > 0 for
some j ∈ {1,2}. W.l.o.g. assume p1
1(s) > 0 (and p2
1(s) ≥ 0). By Lemma
5.1, the deviation min(u1 − ε,p1
1(s) − ε), min(u2 − ε,p2
1(s) − ε) by ﬁrm 2
for ε>0 guarantees that every consumer joins ﬁrm 2, and it yields strictly
positive proﬁt for small enough ε, a contradiction. If p
j
k(s)=0∀ j =1 ,2
and k ∈ {1,2},t h e nN
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=1∀ j ∈ {1,2} by lemma 8.2. This
concludes that if s is a coalition perfect equilibrium, then it cannot be that
N
j
1(s)+N
j
2(s)=0∀ j ∈ {1,2}.Q E D
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m9W.l.o.g. assume that j =1(the other case is
perfectly symmetric), so u1 <u 2.
By Theorem 8, if N1
k(s)+N2
k(s) > 0 for some k ∈ {1,2},t h e np1
k(s)=
−p2
k(s) and pl
k(s) ≤ ul ∀ l =1 ,2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,π1(s)=π2(s)=0 .
Assume N1
1(s)+N2
1(s) > 0 and suppose p1
1(s) >u 1 − u2. Consider the
deviation p1
1(s)−u1−ε,u2−ε by ﬁrm 2 for ε>0. In the subgame following
the deviation, 2 is a strictly dominant strategy for every consumer on side
1, therefore it is the only rationalizable strategy. But then 2 is the only
rationalizable strategy in the subgame for every consumer on side 2, too.
Therefore, after the above deviation, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti sp1
1(s) − u1 + u2 − 2ε.
Since p1
1(s) >u 1 − u2,t h i sp r o ﬁt is strictly positive for small enough ε,
contradicting that s is an equilibrium. A perfectly symmetric argument
shows that it cannot be that N1
2(s)+N2
2(s) > 0 and p1
2(s) >u 1 −u2.Q E D
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 0Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium.
Suppose ﬁrst that N
j
k(s)=0for some j,k ∈ {1,2}.W . l . o . g .a s s u m e
N1
1(s)=0 . Then either N1
1(s)=N2
1(s)=0or N2
1(s) > 0 and p1
1(s)=0 .
In either case, π1 =0and then by the starting assumption π2(s) > 0.L e t
b C2 be the set of consumers who choose 2 in s.N o t et h a tp
j
2(s) < 0 for some
j ∈ {1,2} implies that Cj ⊂ b C2. Consider now deviation (p1
2(s)−ε,p2
2(s)−ε)
for ε>0 by ﬁrm 1. By Lemma 5.1, in the subgame after this deviation 1
is the unique coalitionally rationalizable strategy for every consumer in b C2.
But then for small enough ε the deviation is proﬁtable, a contradiction.
Therefore N
j
k(s) > 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}.
If p
j
1(s) >p
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2}, then by Lemma 5.1, N1
A(s)+N2
A(s)=0 ,
contradicting the above result. Similarly it cannot be that p
j
1(s) <p
j
2(s) ∀
j ∈ {1,2}.
Consider now p
j
1(s)=p
j
2(s) ∀ j ∈ {1,2}. Let b C be the set of consumers
who join some network in s.T h e r e e x i s t s k ∈ {1,2} such that πk(s) ≤
44(π1(s)+π2(s))/2 > 0. W.l.o.g. assume k =1 . Consider deviation (p1
2(s) −
ε,p2
2(s) − ε) by 1. By Lemma 5.1, every consumer in b C chooses 1 after the
deviation. Therefore, if ε is small enough, then after this deviation ﬁrm 1’s
proﬁt is larger than (π1(s)+π2(s))/2 (note that p
j
2(s) < 0 for some j ∈ {1,2}
implies that Cj ⊂ b C), a contradiction.
Finally, notice that if p
j
1(s) ≤ p
j
2(s) for some j ∈ {1,2},t h e nN
j
2(s) > 0
and the assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium imply that N
−j
2 (s) ≥
N
−j
1 (s).I f p
j
1(s) <p
j
2(s) for some j ∈ {1,2},t h e nN
j
2(s) > 0 and the
assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium imply that N
−j
2 (s) >N
−j
1 (s).
Similarly, if p
j
2(s) ≤ p
j
1(s) (correspondingly p
j
2(s) <p
j
1(s))f o rs o m ej ∈
{1,2},t h e nN
−j
2 (s) ≤ N
−j
1 (s) (correspondingly N
−j
2 (s) <N
−j
1 (s)). QED
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 1Let ∆ =m a x
j∈{1,2}
sup
i,i0∈[0,1]
u
j
i
u
j
i0
and let s be a coalition
perfect equilibrium. By the starting assumption, ∆ ≤ 4/3.
Assume there is a coalition perfect equilibrium diﬀerent than 1 or 2 in
the statement of the theorem. Then by Lemma 5.1 ∃ j ∈ {1,2} such that
p
j
1(s) <p
j
2(s),N
j
1(s) ≥ N
j
2(s) and p
−j
1 (s) ≥ p
−j
2 (s), N
−j
1 (s) <N
−j
2 (s).F o r
every j ∈ {1,2},l e tinfi∈[0,1] u
j
i ≡ lj.N o t et h a t∆ ≤ 4/3 implies that lj > 0.
If p
j
k(s) ≤ lj ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}, then an analogous proof to that of Lemma
8.3 establishes that there is a proﬁtable deviation for at least one ﬁrm,
contradicting that s is a coalition perfect equilibrium. The same holds if
p
j
k(s) ≥ 0 ∀ j,k ∈ {1,2}. It is straightforward to show that it cannot be
that for some k ∈ {1,2}, it holds that p
j
k(s) >l j ∀ j ∈ {1,2}.B e l o w w e
consider the remaining possibilities.
Consider ﬁrst the case that for some j,k ∈ {1,2} , it holds that p
j
k(s) >l j,
p
−j
k (s) < 0 and 0 ≤ p1
−k(s),p 2
−k(s).S i n c esupk u
j
k ≤ ∆lj ≤ 4
3lj and p
j
k(s) >
lj,f o rN
j
k(s) > 0 it has to be that N
−j
k (s) > 3
4 (otherwise no consumer on
side j would join k at a price larger than lj). Furthermore, p
j
k(s) >p
j
−k(s)
implies N
j
k(s) ≤ 1
2,a n dsupk u
j
k ≤ ∆lj ≤ 4
3lj implies p
j
k(s) < 4
3lj. Therefore
πk(s) ≤ 2
3lj+ 3
4p
−j
k (s).T h i si m p l i e s0 ≤ 2
3lj+ 3
4p
−j
k (s), which in turn implies
2
3lj + 3
4p
−j
k (s) ≤ lj + 9
8p
−j
k (s) ≤ lj + p
−j
k (s). Therefore πk(s) <l j + p
−j
k (s).
But note that −k can get a proﬁt arbitrarily close to lj+p
−j
k (s) by deviating
to price announcements (lj − ε,p
−j
k (s) − ε) for small enough ε>0 (since
by Lemma 5.1, after that price announcement all consumers choose 2). So
if π−k(s) ≤ πk(s),t h e n−k has a proﬁtable deviation from s. On the other
hand note that k can get a proﬁt arbitrarily close to lj +p
−j
k (s) by deviating
to price announcements (p1
−k(s) − ε,p2
−k(s) − ε) for small enough ε>0.S o
45if π−k(s) >π k(s) then k has a proﬁtable deviation from s. This concludes
that s cannot be a coalition perfect equilibrium, a contradiction.
Consider now the case that for some j,j0,k∈ {1,2},i th o l d st h a tp
j
k(s) >
lj and 0 >p
j0
−k(s). Just like in the previous case, it has to be that N
−j
k (s) > 3
4
and therefore N
−j
−k(s) < 1
4.T h e n supk u
j
k ≤ ∆lj ≤ 4
3lj implies p
j
−k(s) <
1
3lj.T h e n 0 >p
j0
−k(s) and 4
3lj >p
−j0
−k (s) imply that π−k(s) < 1
3lj.S i n c e
N
j
k(s) ≤ 1
2 and p
j
k(s) ≤ 4
3ljN
−j
k (s) and πk(s) ≥ 0, it holds that 2
3ljN
−j
k (s)+
p
−j
k (s)N
−j
k (s) ≥ 0, therefore p
−j
k (s) ≥− 2
3lj. Therefore lj + p
−j
k (s) ≥ 1
3lj.
B u tn o t et h a t−k can get a proﬁt arbirarily close to lj +p
−j
k (s) by deviating
to price announcement (lj − ε,p
−j
k (s) − ε) for small enough ε>0.T h i s
concludes that s cannot be a coalition perfect equilibrium, a contradiction.
QED
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